]> git.meshlink.io Git - meshlink/blobdiff - src/sptps.c
Remove everything GPL that is not copyright Guus Sliepen, update copyright statements.
[meshlink] / src / sptps.c
index c22926a84184353ee59fbad823442074dc561a37..54c5a55e61bc27ed7eff8aec95803c4d3181842e 100644 (file)
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
 /*
     sptps.c -- Simple Peer-to-Peer Security
-    Copyright (C) 2011-2012 Guus Sliepen <guus@tinc-vpn.org>,
-                  2010      Brandon L. Black <blblack@gmail.com>
+    Copyright (C) 2014 Guus Sliepen <guus@meshlink.io>
 
     This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
     it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -22,7 +21,6 @@
 
 #include "cipher.h"
 #include "crypto.h"
-#include "digest.h"
 #include "ecdh.h"
 #include "ecdsa.h"
 #include "logger.h"
@@ -83,32 +81,30 @@ static void warning(sptps_t *s, const char *format, ...) {
 
 // Send a record (datagram version, accepts all record types, handles encryption and authentication).
 static bool send_record_priv_datagram(sptps_t *s, uint8_t type, const char *data, uint16_t len) {
-       char buffer[len + 23UL];
+       char buffer[len + 21UL];
 
        // Create header with sequence number, length and record type
        uint32_t seqno = htonl(s->outseqno++);
-       uint16_t netlen = htons(len);
-
-       memcpy(buffer, &netlen, 2);
-       memcpy(buffer + 2, &seqno, 4);
-       buffer[6] = type;
 
-       // Add plaintext (TODO: avoid unnecessary copy)
-       memcpy(buffer + 7, data, len);
+       memcpy(buffer, &seqno, 4);
+       buffer[4] = type;
 
        if(s->outstate) {
                // If first handshake has finished, encrypt and HMAC
-               cipher_set_counter(&s->outcipher, &seqno, sizeof seqno);
-               if(!cipher_counter_xor(&s->outcipher, buffer + 6, len + 1UL, buffer + 6))
-                       return false;
+               if(!cipher_set_counter(s->outcipher, &seqno, sizeof seqno))
+                       return error(s, EINVAL, "Failed to set counter");
+
+               if(!cipher_gcm_encrypt_start(s->outcipher, buffer + 4, 1, buffer + 4, NULL))
+                       return error(s, EINVAL, "Error encrypting record");
 
-               if(!digest_create(&s->outdigest, buffer, len + 7UL, buffer + 7UL + len))
-                       return false;
+               if(!cipher_gcm_encrypt_finish(s->outcipher, data, len, buffer + 5, NULL))
+                       return error(s, EINVAL, "Error encrypting record");
 
-               return s->send_data(s->handle, type, buffer + 2, len + 21UL);
+               return s->send_data(s->handle, type, buffer, len + 21UL);
        } else {
                // Otherwise send as plaintext
-               return s->send_data(s->handle, type, buffer + 2, len + 5UL);
+               memcpy(buffer + 5, data, len);
+               return s->send_data(s->handle, type, buffer, len + 5UL);
        }
 }
 // Send a record (private version, accepts all record types, handles encryption and authentication).
@@ -116,31 +112,31 @@ static bool send_record_priv(sptps_t *s, uint8_t type, const char *data, uint16_
        if(s->datagram)
                return send_record_priv_datagram(s, type, data, len);
 
-       char buffer[len + 23UL];
+       char buffer[len + 19UL];
 
        // Create header with sequence number, length and record type
        uint32_t seqno = htonl(s->outseqno++);
        uint16_t netlen = htons(len);
 
-       memcpy(buffer, &seqno, 4);
-       memcpy(buffer + 4, &netlen, 2);
-       buffer[6] = type;
-
-       // Add plaintext (TODO: avoid unnecessary copy)
-       memcpy(buffer + 7, data, len);
+       memcpy(buffer, &netlen, 2);
+       buffer[2] = type;
 
        if(s->outstate) {
                // If first handshake has finished, encrypt and HMAC
-               if(!cipher_counter_xor(&s->outcipher, buffer + 4, len + 3UL, buffer + 4))
-                       return false;
+               if(!cipher_set_counter(s->outcipher, &seqno, 4))
+                       return error(s, EINVAL, "Failed to set counter");
+
+               if(!cipher_gcm_encrypt_start(s->outcipher, buffer, 3, buffer, NULL))
+                       return error(s, EINVAL, "Error encrypting record");
 
-               if(!digest_create(&s->outdigest, buffer, len + 7UL, buffer + 7UL + len))
-                       return false;
+               if(!cipher_gcm_encrypt_finish(s->outcipher, data, len, buffer + 3, NULL))
+                       return error(s, EINVAL, "Error encrypting record");
 
-               return s->send_data(s->handle, type, buffer + 4, len + 19UL);
+               return s->send_data(s->handle, type, buffer, len + 19UL);
        } else {
                // Otherwise send as plaintext
-               return s->send_data(s->handle, type, buffer + 4, len + 3UL);
+               memcpy(buffer + 3, data, len);
+               return s->send_data(s->handle, type, buffer, len + 3UL);
        }
 }
 
@@ -163,7 +159,7 @@ static bool send_kex(sptps_t *s) {
 
        // Make room for our KEX message, which we will keep around since send_sig() needs it.
        if(s->mykex)
-               abort();
+               return false;
        s->mykex = realloc(s->mykex, 1 + 32 + keylen);
        if(!s->mykex)
                return error(s, errno, strerror(errno));
@@ -175,8 +171,8 @@ static bool send_kex(sptps_t *s) {
        randomize(s->mykex + 1, 32);
 
        // Create a new ECDH public key.
-       if(!ecdh_generate_public(&s->ecdh, s->mykex + 1 + 32))
-               return false;
+       if(!(s->ecdh = ecdh_generate_public(s->mykex + 1 + 32)))
+               return error(s, EINVAL, "Failed to generate ECDH public key");
 
        return send_record_priv(s, SPTPS_HANDSHAKE, s->mykex, 1 + 32 + keylen);
 }
@@ -184,7 +180,7 @@ static bool send_kex(sptps_t *s) {
 // Send a SIGnature record, containing an ECDSA signature over both KEX records.
 static bool send_sig(sptps_t *s) {
        size_t keylen = ECDH_SIZE;
-       size_t siglen = ecdsa_size(&s->mykey);
+       size_t siglen = ecdsa_size(s->mykey);
 
        // Concatenate both KEX messages, plus tag indicating if it is from the connection originator, plus label
        char msg[(1 + 32 + keylen) * 2 + 1 + s->labellen];
@@ -196,8 +192,8 @@ static bool send_sig(sptps_t *s) {
        memcpy(msg + 1 + 2 * (33 + keylen), s->label, s->labellen);
 
        // Sign the result.
-       if(!ecdsa_sign(&s->mykey, msg, sizeof msg, sig))
-               return false;
+       if(!ecdsa_sign(s->mykey, msg, sizeof msg, sig))
+               return error(s, EINVAL, "Failed to sign SIG record");
 
        // Send the SIG exchange record.
        return send_record_priv(s, SPTPS_HANDSHAKE, sig, sizeof sig);
@@ -207,17 +203,14 @@ static bool send_sig(sptps_t *s) {
 static bool generate_key_material(sptps_t *s, const char *shared, size_t len) {
        // Initialise cipher and digest structures if necessary
        if(!s->outstate) {
-               bool result
-                       =  cipher_open_by_name(&s->incipher, "aes-256-ecb")
-                       && cipher_open_by_name(&s->outcipher, "aes-256-ecb")
-                       && digest_open_by_name(&s->indigest, "sha256", 16)
-                       && digest_open_by_name(&s->outdigest, "sha256", 16);
-               if(!result)
-                       return false;
+               s->incipher = cipher_open_by_name("aes-256-gcm");
+               s->outcipher = cipher_open_by_name("aes-256-gcm");
+               if(!s->incipher || !s->outcipher)
+                       return error(s, EINVAL, "Failed to open cipher");
        }
 
        // Allocate memory for key material
-       size_t keylen = digest_keylength(&s->indigest) + digest_keylength(&s->outdigest) + cipher_keylength(&s->incipher) + cipher_keylength(&s->outcipher);
+       size_t keylen = cipher_keylength(s->incipher) + cipher_keylength(s->outcipher);
 
        s->key = realloc(s->key, keylen);
        if(!s->key)
@@ -237,7 +230,7 @@ static bool generate_key_material(sptps_t *s, const char *shared, size_t len) {
 
        // Use PRF to generate the key material
        if(!prf(shared, len, seed, s->labellen + 64 + 13, s->key, keylen))
-               return false;
+               return error(s, EINVAL, "Failed to generate key material");
 
        return true;
 }
@@ -253,17 +246,11 @@ static bool receive_ack(sptps_t *s, const char *data, uint16_t len) {
                return error(s, EIO, "Invalid ACK record length");
 
        if(s->initiator) {
-               bool result
-                       = cipher_set_counter_key(&s->incipher, s->key)
-                       && digest_set_key(&s->indigest, s->key + cipher_keylength(&s->incipher), digest_keylength(&s->indigest));
-               if(!result)
-                       return false;
+               if(!cipher_set_counter_key(s->incipher, s->key))
+                       return error(s, EINVAL, "Failed to set counter");
        } else {
-               bool result
-                       = cipher_set_counter_key(&s->incipher, s->key + cipher_keylength(&s->outcipher) + digest_keylength(&s->outdigest))
-                       && digest_set_key(&s->indigest, s->key + cipher_keylength(&s->outcipher) + digest_keylength(&s->outdigest) + cipher_keylength(&s->incipher), digest_keylength(&s->indigest));
-               if(!result)
-                       return false;
+               if(!cipher_set_counter_key(s->incipher, s->key + cipher_keylength(s->outcipher)))
+                       return error(s, EINVAL, "Failed to set counter");
        }
 
        free(s->key);
@@ -283,7 +270,7 @@ static bool receive_kex(sptps_t *s, const char *data, uint16_t len) {
 
        // Make a copy of the KEX message, send_sig() and receive_sig() need it
        if(s->hiskex)
-               abort();
+               return error(s, EINVAL, "Received a second KEX message before first has been processed");
        s->hiskex = realloc(s->hiskex, len);
        if(!s->hiskex)
                return error(s, errno, strerror(errno));
@@ -296,7 +283,7 @@ static bool receive_kex(sptps_t *s, const char *data, uint16_t len) {
 // Receive a SIGnature record, verify it, if it passed, compute the shared secret and calculate the session keys.
 static bool receive_sig(sptps_t *s, const char *data, uint16_t len) {
        size_t keylen = ECDH_SIZE;
-       size_t siglen = ecdsa_size(&s->hiskey);
+       size_t siglen = ecdsa_size(s->hiskey);
 
        // Verify length of KEX record.
        if(len != siglen)
@@ -311,13 +298,14 @@ static bool receive_sig(sptps_t *s, const char *data, uint16_t len) {
        memcpy(msg + 1 + 2 * (33 + keylen), s->label, s->labellen);
 
        // Verify signature.
-       if(!ecdsa_verify(&s->hiskey, msg, sizeof msg, data))
-               return false;
+       if(!ecdsa_verify(s->hiskey, msg, sizeof msg, data))
+               return error(s, EIO, "Failed to verify SIG record");
 
        // Compute shared secret.
        char shared[ECDH_SHARED_SIZE];
-       if(!ecdh_compute_shared(&s->ecdh, s->hiskex + 1 + 32, shared))
-               return false;
+       if(!ecdh_compute_shared(s->ecdh, s->hiskex + 1 + 32, shared))
+               return error(s, EINVAL, "Failed to compute ECDH shared secret");
+       s->ecdh = NULL;
 
        // Generate key material from shared secret.
        if(!generate_key_material(s, shared, sizeof shared))
@@ -335,17 +323,11 @@ static bool receive_sig(sptps_t *s, const char *data, uint16_t len) {
 
        // TODO: only set new keys after ACK has been set/received
        if(s->initiator) {
-               bool result
-                       = cipher_set_counter_key(&s->outcipher, s->key + cipher_keylength(&s->incipher) + digest_keylength(&s->indigest))
-                       && digest_set_key(&s->outdigest, s->key + cipher_keylength(&s->incipher) + digest_keylength(&s->indigest) + cipher_keylength(&s->outcipher), digest_keylength(&s->outdigest));
-               if(!result)
-                       return false;
+               if(!cipher_set_counter_key(s->outcipher, s->key + cipher_keylength(s->incipher)))
+                       return error(s, EINVAL, "Failed to set counter");
        } else {
-               bool result
-                       =  cipher_set_counter_key(&s->outcipher, s->key)
-                       && digest_set_key(&s->outdigest, s->key + cipher_keylength(&s->outcipher), digest_keylength(&s->outdigest));
-               if(!result)
-                       return false;
+               if(!cipher_set_counter_key(s->outcipher, s->key))
+                       return error(s, EINVAL, "Failed to set counter");
        }
 
        return true;
@@ -398,22 +380,18 @@ static bool receive_handshake(sptps_t *s, const char *data, uint16_t len) {
                        return true;
                // TODO: split ACK into a VERify and ACK?
                default:
-                       return error(s, EIO, "Invalid session state");
+                       return error(s, EIO, "Invalid session state %d", s->state);
        }
 }
 
 // Check datagram for valid HMAC
 bool sptps_verify_datagram(sptps_t *s, const char *data, size_t len) {
        if(!s->instate || len < 21)
-               return false;
+               return error(s, EIO, "Received short packet");
 
-       char buffer[len + 23];
-       uint16_t netlen = htons(len - 21);
+       // TODO: just decrypt without updating the replay window
 
-       memcpy(buffer, &netlen, 2);
-       memcpy(buffer + 2, data, len);
-
-       return digest_verify(&s->indigest, buffer, len - 14, buffer + len - 14);
+       return true;
 }
 
 // Receive incoming data, datagram version.
@@ -439,18 +417,16 @@ static bool sptps_receive_data_datagram(sptps_t *s, const char *data, size_t len
                return receive_handshake(s, data + 5, len - 5);
        }
 
-       // Check HMAC.
-       uint16_t netlen = htons(len - 21);
+       // Decrypt
 
-       char buffer[len + 23];
+       char buffer[len];
 
-       memcpy(buffer, &netlen, 2);
-       memcpy(buffer + 2, data, len);
+       if(!cipher_set_counter(s->incipher, data, sizeof seqno))
+               return error(s, EINVAL, "Failed to set counter");
+       size_t outlen;
 
-       memcpy(&seqno, buffer + 2, 4);
-
-       if(!digest_verify(&s->indigest, buffer, len - 14, buffer + len - 14))
-               return error(s, EIO, "Invalid HMAC");
+       if(!cipher_gcm_decrypt(s->incipher, data + 4, len - 4, buffer, &outlen))
+               return error(s, EIO, "Failed to decrypt and verify packet");
 
        // Replay protection using a sliding window of configurable size.
        // s->inseqno is expected sequence number
@@ -460,13 +436,10 @@ static bool sptps_receive_data_datagram(sptps_t *s, const char *data, size_t len
        if(s->replaywin) {
                if(seqno != s->inseqno) {
                        if(seqno >= s->inseqno + s->replaywin * 8) {
-                               // Prevent packets that jump far ahead of the queue from causing many others to be dropped.
-                               if(s->farfuture++ < s->replaywin >> 2)
-                                       return error(s, EIO, "Packet is %d seqs in the future, dropped (%u)\n", seqno - s->inseqno, s->farfuture);
-
-                               // Unless we have seen lots of them, in which case we consider the others lost.
+                               // TODO: Prevent packets that jump far ahead of the queue from causing many others to be dropped.
                                warning(s, "Lost %d packets\n", seqno - s->inseqno);
-                               memset(s->late, 0, s->replaywin);
+                               // Mark all packets in the replay window as being late.
+                               memset(s->late, 255, s->replaywin);
                        } else if (seqno < s->inseqno) {
                                // If the sequence number is farther in the past than the bitmap goes, or if the packet was already received, drop it.
                                if((s->inseqno >= s->replaywin * 8 && seqno < s->inseqno - s->replaywin * 8) || !(s->late[(seqno / 8) % s->replaywin] & (1 << seqno % 8)))
@@ -480,10 +453,9 @@ static bool sptps_receive_data_datagram(sptps_t *s, const char *data, size_t len
 
                // Mark the current packet as not being late.
                s->late[(seqno / 8) % s->replaywin] &= ~(1 << seqno % 8);
-               s->farfuture = 0;
        }
 
-       if(seqno > s->inseqno)
+       if(seqno >= s->inseqno)
                s->inseqno = seqno + 1;
 
        if(!s->inseqno)
@@ -491,26 +463,21 @@ static bool sptps_receive_data_datagram(sptps_t *s, const char *data, size_t len
        else
                s->received++;
 
-       // Decrypt.
-       cipher_set_counter(&s->incipher, &seqno, sizeof seqno);
-       if(!cipher_counter_xor(&s->incipher, buffer + 6, len - 4, buffer + 6))
-               return false;
-
        // Append a NULL byte for safety.
-       buffer[len - 14] = 0;
+       buffer[len - 20] = 0;
 
-       uint8_t type = buffer[6];
+       uint8_t type = buffer[0];
 
        if(type < SPTPS_HANDSHAKE) {
                if(!s->instate)
                        return error(s, EIO, "Application record received before handshake finished");
-               if(!s->receive_record(s->handle, type, buffer + 7, len - 21))
-                       return false;
+               if(!s->receive_record(s->handle, type, buffer + 1, len - 21))
+                       abort();
        } else if(type == SPTPS_HANDSHAKE) {
-               if(!receive_handshake(s, buffer + 7, len - 21))
-                       return false;
+               if(!receive_handshake(s, buffer + 1, len - 21))
+                       abort();
        } else {
-               return error(s, EIO, "Invalid record type");
+               return error(s, EIO, "Invalid record type %d", type);
        }
 
        return true;
@@ -518,13 +485,16 @@ static bool sptps_receive_data_datagram(sptps_t *s, const char *data, size_t len
 
 // Receive incoming data. Check if it contains a complete record, if so, handle it.
 bool sptps_receive_data(sptps_t *s, const char *data, size_t len) {
+       if(!s->state)
+               return error(s, EIO, "Invalid session state zero");
+
        if(s->datagram)
                return sptps_receive_data_datagram(s, data, len);
 
        while(len) {
                // First read the 2 length bytes.
-               if(s->buflen < 6) {
-                       size_t toread = 6 - s->buflen;
+               if(s->buflen < 2) {
+                       size_t toread = 2 - s->buflen;
                        if(toread > len)
                                toread = len;
 
@@ -535,36 +505,39 @@ bool sptps_receive_data(sptps_t *s, const char *data, size_t len) {
                        data += toread;
 
                        // Exit early if we don't have the full length.
-                       if(s->buflen < 6)
+                       if(s->buflen < 2)
                                return true;
 
+                       // Update sequence number.
+
+                       uint32_t seqno = htonl(s->inseqno++);
+
                        // Decrypt the length bytes
 
                        if(s->instate) {
-                               if(!cipher_counter_xor(&s->incipher, s->inbuf + 4, 2, &s->reclen))
-                                       return false;
+                               if(!cipher_set_counter(s->incipher, &seqno, 4))
+                                       return error(s, EINVAL, "Failed to set counter");
+
+                               if(!cipher_gcm_decrypt_start(s->incipher, s->inbuf, 2, &s->reclen, NULL))
+                                       return error(s, EINVAL, "Failed to decrypt record");
                        } else {
-                               memcpy(&s->reclen, s->inbuf + 4, 2);
+                               memcpy(&s->reclen, s->inbuf, 2);
                        }
 
                        s->reclen = ntohs(s->reclen);
 
                        // If we have the length bytes, ensure our buffer can hold the whole request.
-                       s->inbuf = realloc(s->inbuf, s->reclen + 23UL);
+                       s->inbuf = realloc(s->inbuf, s->reclen + 19UL);
                        if(!s->inbuf)
                                return error(s, errno, strerror(errno));
 
-                       // Add sequence number.
-                       uint32_t seqno = htonl(s->inseqno++);
-                       memcpy(s->inbuf, &seqno, 4);
-
                        // Exit early if we have no more data to process.
                        if(!len)
                                return true;
                }
 
                // Read up to the end of the record.
-               size_t toread = s->reclen + (s->instate ? 23UL : 7UL) - s->buflen;
+               size_t toread = s->reclen + (s->instate ? 19UL : 3UL) - s->buflen;
                if(toread > len)
                        toread = len;
 
@@ -574,43 +547,40 @@ bool sptps_receive_data(sptps_t *s, const char *data, size_t len) {
                data += toread;
 
                // If we don't have a whole record, exit.
-               if(s->buflen < s->reclen + (s->instate ? 23UL : 7UL))
+               if(s->buflen < s->reclen + (s->instate ? 19UL : 3UL))
                        return true;
 
                // Check HMAC and decrypt.
                if(s->instate) {
-                       if(!digest_verify(&s->indigest, s->inbuf, s->reclen + 7UL, s->inbuf + s->reclen + 7UL))
-                               return error(s, EIO, "Invalid HMAC");
-
-                       if(!cipher_counter_xor(&s->incipher, s->inbuf + 6UL, s->reclen + 1UL, s->inbuf + 6UL))
-                               return false;
+                       if(!cipher_gcm_decrypt_finish(s->incipher, s->inbuf + 2UL, s->reclen + 17UL, s->inbuf + 2UL, NULL))
+                               return error(s, EINVAL, "Failed to decrypt and verify record");
                }
 
                // Append a NULL byte for safety.
-               s->inbuf[s->reclen + 7UL] = 0;
+               s->inbuf[s->reclen + 3UL] = 0;
 
-               uint8_t type = s->inbuf[6];
+               uint8_t type = s->inbuf[2];
 
                if(type < SPTPS_HANDSHAKE) {
                        if(!s->instate)
                                return error(s, EIO, "Application record received before handshake finished");
-                       if(!s->receive_record(s->handle, type, s->inbuf + 7, s->reclen))
+                       if(!s->receive_record(s->handle, type, s->inbuf + 3, s->reclen))
                                return false;
                } else if(type == SPTPS_HANDSHAKE) {
-                       if(!receive_handshake(s, s->inbuf + 7, s->reclen))
+                       if(!receive_handshake(s, s->inbuf + 3, s->reclen))
                                return false;
                } else {
-                       return error(s, EIO, "Invalid record type");
+                       return error(s, EIO, "Invalid record type %d", type);
                }
 
-               s->buflen = 4;
+               s->buflen = 0;
        }
 
        return true;
 }
 
 // Start a SPTPS session.
-bool sptps_start(sptps_t *s, void *handle, bool initiator, bool datagram, ecdsa_t mykey, ecdsa_t hiskey, const char *label, size_t labellen, send_data_t send_data, receive_record_t receive_record) {
+bool sptps_start(sptps_t *s, void *handle, bool initiator, bool datagram, ecdsa_t *mykey, ecdsa_t *hiskey, const char *label, size_t labellen, send_data_t send_data, receive_record_t receive_record) {
        // Initialise struct sptps
        memset(s, 0, sizeof *s);
 
@@ -624,6 +594,7 @@ bool sptps_start(sptps_t *s, void *handle, bool initiator, bool datagram, ecdsa_
                s->late = malloc(s->replaywin);
                if(!s->late)
                        return error(s, errno, strerror(errno));
+               memset(s->late, 0, s->replaywin);
        }
 
        s->label = malloc(labellen);
@@ -634,8 +605,7 @@ bool sptps_start(sptps_t *s, void *handle, bool initiator, bool datagram, ecdsa_
                s->inbuf = malloc(7);
                if(!s->inbuf)
                        return error(s, errno, strerror(errno));
-               s->buflen = 4;
-               memset(s->inbuf, 0, 4);
+               s->buflen = 0;
        }
 
        memcpy(s->label, label, labellen);
@@ -652,11 +622,11 @@ bool sptps_start(sptps_t *s, void *handle, bool initiator, bool datagram, ecdsa_
 // Stop a SPTPS session.
 bool sptps_stop(sptps_t *s) {
        // Clean up any resources.
-       cipher_close(&s->incipher);
-       cipher_close(&s->outcipher);
-       digest_close(&s->indigest);
-       digest_close(&s->outdigest);
-       ecdh_free(&s->ecdh);
+       cipher_close(s->incipher);
+       cipher_close(s->outcipher);
+       digest_close(s->indigest);
+       digest_close(s->outdigest);
+       ecdh_free(s->ecdh);
        free(s->inbuf);
        free(s->mykex);
        free(s->hiskex);