#include "node.h"
#include "prf.h"
#include "protocol.h"
-#include "rsa.h"
#include "sptps.h"
#include "utils.h"
#include "xalloc.h"
bool send_id(connection_t *c) {
gettimeofday(&c->start, NULL);
- int minor = 0;
-
- if(experimental) {
- if(c->outgoing && !read_ecdsa_public_key(c))
- minor = 1;
- else
- minor = myself->connection->protocol_minor;
- }
+ int minor = myself->connection->protocol_minor;
if(proxytype && c->outgoing)
if(!send_proxyrequest(c))
return send_ack(c);
}
- if(!experimental)
- c->protocol_minor = 0;
-
if(!c->config_tree) {
init_configuration(&c->config_tree);
return false;
}
- if(experimental)
- read_ecdsa_public_key(c);
+ read_ecdsa_public_key(c);
} else {
if(c->protocol_minor && !ecdsa_active(c->ecdsa))
c->protocol_minor = 1;
c->allow_request = METAKEY;
- if(c->protocol_minor >= 2) {
- c->allow_request = ACK;
- char label[25 + strlen(myself->name) + strlen(c->name)];
-
- if(c->outgoing)
- snprintf(label, sizeof label, "tinc TCP key expansion %s %s", myself->name, c->name);
- else
- snprintf(label, sizeof label, "tinc TCP key expansion %s %s", c->name, myself->name);
-
- return sptps_start(&c->sptps, c, c->outgoing, false, myself->connection->ecdsa, c->ecdsa, label, sizeof label, send_meta_sptps, receive_meta_sptps);
- } else {
- return send_metakey(c);
- }
-}
-
-bool send_metakey(connection_t *c) {
- if(!read_rsa_public_key(c))
- return false;
-
- if(!(c->outcipher = cipher_open_blowfish_ofb()))
- return false;
-
- if(!(c->outdigest = digest_open_sha1(-1)))
- return false;
-
- size_t len = rsa_size(c->rsa);
- char key[len];
- char enckey[len];
- char hexkey[2 * len + 1];
-
- /* Create a random key */
-
- randomize(key, len);
-
- /* The message we send must be smaller than the modulus of the RSA key.
- By definition, for a key of k bits, the following formula holds:
-
- 2^(k-1) <= modulus < 2^(k)
-
- Where ^ means "to the power of", not "xor".
- This means that to be sure, we must choose our message < 2^(k-1).
- This can be done by setting the most significant bit to zero.
- */
-
- key[0] &= 0x7F;
-
- if(!cipher_set_key_from_rsa(c->outcipher, key, len, true))
- return false;
-
- if(debug_level >= DEBUG_SCARY_THINGS) {
- bin2hex(key, hexkey, len);
- logger(DEBUG_SCARY_THINGS, LOG_DEBUG, "Generated random meta key (unencrypted): %s", hexkey);
- }
-
- /* Encrypt the random data
-
- We do not use one of the PKCS padding schemes here.
- This is allowed, because we encrypt a totally random string
- with a length equal to that of the modulus of the RSA key.
- */
-
- if(!rsa_public_encrypt(c->rsa, key, len, enckey)) {
- logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Error during encryption of meta key for %s (%s)", c->name, c->hostname);
- return false;
- }
-
- /* Convert the encrypted random data to a hexadecimal formatted string */
-
- bin2hex(enckey, hexkey, len);
-
- /* Send the meta key */
-
- bool result = send_request(c, "%d %d %d %d %d %s", METAKEY,
- cipher_get_nid(c->outcipher),
- digest_get_nid(c->outdigest), c->outmaclength,
- c->outcompression, hexkey);
-
- c->status.encryptout = true;
- return result;
-}
-
-bool metakey_h(connection_t *c, const char *request) {
- char hexkey[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
- int cipher, digest, maclength, compression;
- size_t len = rsa_size(myself->connection->rsa);
- char enckey[len];
- char key[len];
-
- if(sscanf(request, "%*d %d %d %d %d " MAX_STRING, &cipher, &digest, &maclength, &compression, hexkey) != 5) {
- logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "METAKEY", c->name, c->hostname);
- return false;
- }
-
- /* Convert the challenge from hexadecimal back to binary */
-
- int inlen = hex2bin(hexkey, enckey, sizeof enckey);
-
- /* Check if the length of the meta key is all right */
-
- if(inlen != len) {
- logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name, c->hostname, "wrong keylength");
- return false;
- }
-
- /* Decrypt the meta key */
-
- if(!rsa_private_decrypt(myself->connection->rsa, enckey, len, key)) {
- logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Error during decryption of meta key for %s (%s)", c->name, c->hostname);
- return false;
- }
-
- if(debug_level >= DEBUG_SCARY_THINGS) {
- bin2hex(key, hexkey, len);
- logger(DEBUG_SCARY_THINGS, LOG_DEBUG, "Received random meta key (unencrypted): %s", hexkey);
- }
-
- /* Check and lookup cipher and digest algorithms */
-
- if(!(c->incipher = cipher_open_by_nid(cipher)) || !cipher_set_key_from_rsa(c->incipher, key, len, false)) {
- logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Error during initialisation of cipher from %s (%s)", c->name, c->hostname);
- return false;
- }
-
- if(!(c->indigest = digest_open_by_nid(digest, -1))) {
- logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Error during initialisation of digest from %s (%s)", c->name, c->hostname);
- return false;
- }
-
- c->status.decryptin = true;
-
- c->allow_request = CHALLENGE;
-
- return send_challenge(c);
-}
-
-bool send_challenge(connection_t *c) {
- size_t len = rsa_size(c->rsa);
- char buffer[len * 2 + 1];
-
- if(!c->hischallenge)
- c->hischallenge = xrealloc(c->hischallenge, len);
-
- /* Copy random data to the buffer */
-
- randomize(c->hischallenge, len);
-
- /* Convert to hex */
-
- bin2hex(c->hischallenge, buffer, len);
-
- /* Send the challenge */
-
- return send_request(c, "%d %s", CHALLENGE, buffer);
-}
-
-bool challenge_h(connection_t *c, const char *request) {
- char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
- size_t len = rsa_size(myself->connection->rsa);
- size_t digestlen = digest_length(c->indigest);
- char digest[digestlen];
-
- if(sscanf(request, "%*d " MAX_STRING, buffer) != 1) {
- logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "CHALLENGE", c->name, c->hostname);
- return false;
- }
-
- /* Convert the challenge from hexadecimal back to binary */
-
- int inlen = hex2bin(buffer, buffer, sizeof buffer);
-
- /* Check if the length of the challenge is all right */
-
- if(inlen != len) {
- logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name, c->hostname, "wrong challenge length");
- return false;
- }
-
- /* Calculate the hash from the challenge we received */
-
- if(!digest_create(c->indigest, buffer, len, digest))
- return false;
-
- /* Convert the hash to a hexadecimal formatted string */
-
- bin2hex(digest, buffer, digestlen);
-
- /* Send the reply */
-
- c->allow_request = CHAL_REPLY;
-
- return send_request(c, "%d %s", CHAL_REPLY, buffer);
-}
-
-bool chal_reply_h(connection_t *c, const char *request) {
- char hishash[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
-
- if(sscanf(request, "%*d " MAX_STRING, hishash) != 1) {
- logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "CHAL_REPLY", c->name,
- c->hostname);
- return false;
- }
-
- /* Convert the hash to binary format */
-
- int inlen = hex2bin(hishash, hishash, sizeof hishash);
-
- /* Check if the length of the hash is all right */
-
- if(inlen != digest_length(c->outdigest)) {
- logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name, c->hostname, "wrong challenge reply length");
- return false;
- }
-
-
- /* Verify the hash */
-
- if(!digest_verify(c->outdigest, c->hischallenge, rsa_size(c->rsa), hishash)) {
- logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name, c->hostname, "wrong challenge reply");
- return false;
- }
-
- /* Identity has now been positively verified.
- Send an acknowledgement with the rest of the information needed.
- */
-
- free(c->hischallenge);
- c->hischallenge = NULL;
c->allow_request = ACK;
+ char label[25 + strlen(myself->name) + strlen(c->name)];
- return send_ack(c);
-}
-
-static bool send_upgrade(connection_t *c) {
- /* Special case when protocol_minor is 1: the other end is ECDSA capable,
- * but doesn't know our key yet. So send it now. */
-
- char *pubkey = ecdsa_get_base64_public_key(myself->connection->ecdsa);
-
- if(!pubkey)
- return false;
+ if(c->outgoing)
+ snprintf(label, sizeof label, "tinc TCP key expansion %s %s", myself->name, c->name);
+ else
+ snprintf(label, sizeof label, "tinc TCP key expansion %s %s", c->name, myself->name);
- bool result = send_request(c, "%d %s", ACK, pubkey);
- free(pubkey);
- return result;
+ return sptps_start(&c->sptps, c, c->outgoing, false, myself->connection->ecdsa, c->ecdsa, label, sizeof label, send_meta_sptps, receive_meta_sptps);
}
bool send_ack(connection_t *c) {
- if(c->protocol_minor == 1)
- return send_upgrade(c);
-
/* ACK message contains rest of the information the other end needs
to create node_t and edge_t structures. */
if(!get_config_int(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "Weight"), &c->estimated_weight))
get_config_int(lookup_config(config_tree, "Weight"), &c->estimated_weight);
- return send_request(c, "%d %s %d %x", ACK, myport, c->estimated_weight, (c->options & 0xffffff) | (experimental ? (PROT_MINOR << 24) : 0));
+ return send_request(c, "%d %s %d %x", ACK, myport, c->estimated_weight, (c->options & 0xffffff) | (PROT_MINOR << 24));
}
static void send_everything(connection_t *c) {
}
}
-static bool upgrade_h(connection_t *c, const char *request) {
- char pubkey[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
-
- if(sscanf(request, "%*d " MAX_STRING, pubkey) != 1) {
- logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "ACK", c->name, c->hostname);
- return false;
- }
-
- if(ecdsa_active(c->ecdsa) || read_ecdsa_public_key(c)) {
- logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_INFO, "Already have ECDSA public key from %s (%s), not upgrading.", c->name, c->hostname);
- return false;
- }
-
- logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_INFO, "Got ECDSA public key from %s (%s), upgrading!", c->name, c->hostname);
- append_config_file(c->name, "ECDSAPublicKey", pubkey);
- c->allow_request = TERMREQ;
- return send_termreq(c);
-}
-
bool ack_h(connection_t *c, const char *request) {
- if(c->protocol_minor == 1)
- return upgrade_h(c, request);
-
char hisport[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
char *hisaddress;
int weight, mtu;
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