X-Git-Url: http://git.meshlink.io/?p=meshlink;a=blobdiff_plain;f=src%2Fsptps.c;h=ed1f67ff95afd11ac1adfd6f6b95edcca72bf7de;hp=e03b18a8b12e498182ee16b04deb37f337d90be1;hb=963c5055505f2fc117cd5efa06eaa02c9b2bf85d;hpb=2cfd1205dc9c6e9d42cc569f415afe13f52357ec diff --git a/src/sptps.c b/src/sptps.c index e03b18a8..ed1f67ff 100644 --- a/src/sptps.c +++ b/src/sptps.c @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ /* sptps.c -- Simple Peer-to-Peer Security - Copyright (C) 2014 Guus Sliepen + Copyright (C) 2014-2017 Guus Sliepen This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by @@ -27,8 +27,6 @@ #include "prf.h" #include "sptps.h" -unsigned int sptps_replaywin = 16; - /* Nonce MUST be exchanged first (done) Signatures MUST be done over both nonces, to guarantee the signature is fresh @@ -50,17 +48,31 @@ unsigned int sptps_replaywin = 16; */ void sptps_log_quiet(sptps_t *s, int s_errno, const char *format, va_list ap) { + (void)s; + (void)s_errno; + (void)format; + (void)ap; + + assert(format); } void sptps_log_stderr(sptps_t *s, int s_errno, const char *format, va_list ap) { + (void)s; + (void)s_errno; + + assert(format); + vfprintf(stderr, format, ap); fputc('\n', stderr); } -void (*sptps_log)(sptps_t *s, int s_errno, const char *format, va_list ap) = sptps_log_stderr; +void (*sptps_log)(sptps_t *s, int s_errno, const char *format, va_list ap) = sptps_log_quiet; // Log an error message. static bool error(sptps_t *s, int s_errno, const char *format, ...) { + assert(s_errno); + assert(format); + if(format) { va_list ap; va_start(ap, format); @@ -73,6 +85,8 @@ static bool error(sptps_t *s, int s_errno, const char *format, ...) { } static void warning(sptps_t *s, const char *format, ...) { + assert(format); + va_list ap; va_start(ap, format); sptps_log(s, 0, format, ap); @@ -102,8 +116,9 @@ static bool send_record_priv_datagram(sptps_t *s, uint8_t type, const void *data } // Send a record (private version, accepts all record types, handles encryption and authentication). static bool send_record_priv(sptps_t *s, uint8_t type, const void *data, uint16_t len) { - if(s->datagram) + if(s->datagram) { return send_record_priv_datagram(s, type, data, len); + } char buffer[len + 19UL]; @@ -127,13 +142,17 @@ static bool send_record_priv(sptps_t *s, uint8_t type, const void *data, uint16_ // Send an application record. bool sptps_send_record(sptps_t *s, uint8_t type, const void *data, uint16_t len) { + assert(!len || data); + // Sanity checks: application cannot send data before handshake is finished, // and only record types 0..127 are allowed. - if(!s->outstate) + if(!s->outstate) { return error(s, EINVAL, "Handshake phase not finished yet"); + } - if(type >= SPTPS_HANDSHAKE) + if(type >= SPTPS_HANDSHAKE) { return error(s, EINVAL, "Invalid application record type"); + } return send_record_priv(s, type, data, len); } @@ -143,11 +162,15 @@ static bool send_kex(sptps_t *s) { size_t keylen = ECDH_SIZE; // Make room for our KEX message, which we will keep around since send_sig() needs it. - if(s->mykex) + if(s->mykex) { return false; + } + s->mykex = realloc(s->mykex, 1 + 32 + keylen); - if(!s->mykex) + + if(!s->mykex) { return error(s, errno, strerror(errno)); + } // Set version byte to zero. s->mykex[0] = SPTPS_VERSION; @@ -156,8 +179,9 @@ static bool send_kex(sptps_t *s) { randomize(s->mykex + 1, 32); // Create a new ECDH public key. - if(!(s->ecdh = ecdh_generate_public(s->mykex + 1 + 32))) + if(!(s->ecdh = ecdh_generate_public(s->mykex + 1 + 32))) { return error(s, EINVAL, "Failed to generate ECDH public key"); + } return send_record_priv(s, SPTPS_HANDSHAKE, s->mykex, 1 + 32 + keylen); } @@ -177,33 +201,42 @@ static bool send_sig(sptps_t *s) { memcpy(msg + 1 + 2 * (33 + keylen), s->label, s->labellen); // Sign the result. - if(!ecdsa_sign(s->mykey, msg, sizeof msg, sig)) + if(!ecdsa_sign(s->mykey, msg, sizeof(msg), sig)) { return error(s, EINVAL, "Failed to sign SIG record"); + } // Send the SIG exchange record. - return send_record_priv(s, SPTPS_HANDSHAKE, sig, sizeof sig); + return send_record_priv(s, SPTPS_HANDSHAKE, sig, sizeof(sig)); } // Generate key material from the shared secret created from the ECDHE key exchange. static bool generate_key_material(sptps_t *s, const char *shared, size_t len) { + assert(shared); + assert(len); + // Initialise cipher and digest structures if necessary if(!s->outstate) { s->incipher = chacha_poly1305_init(); s->outcipher = chacha_poly1305_init(); - if(!s->incipher || !s->outcipher) + + if(!s->incipher || !s->outcipher) { return error(s, EINVAL, "Failed to open cipher"); + } } // Allocate memory for key material size_t keylen = 2 * CHACHA_POLY1305_KEYLEN; s->key = realloc(s->key, keylen); - if(!s->key) + + if(!s->key) { return error(s, errno, strerror(errno)); + } // Create the HMAC seed, which is "key expansion" + session label + server nonce + client nonce char seed[s->labellen + 64 + 13]; strcpy(seed, "key expansion"); + if(s->initiator) { memcpy(seed + 13, s->mykex + 1, 32); memcpy(seed + 45, s->hiskex + 1, 32); @@ -211,11 +244,13 @@ static bool generate_key_material(sptps_t *s, const char *shared, size_t len) { memcpy(seed + 13, s->hiskex + 1, 32); memcpy(seed + 45, s->mykex + 1, 32); } + memcpy(seed + 77, s->label, s->labellen); // Use PRF to generate the key material - if(!prf(shared, len, seed, s->labellen + 64 + 13, s->key, keylen)) + if(!prf(shared, len, seed, s->labellen + 64 + 13, s->key, keylen)) { return error(s, EINVAL, "Failed to generate key material"); + } return true; } @@ -227,15 +262,20 @@ static bool send_ack(sptps_t *s) { // Receive an ACKnowledgement record. static bool receive_ack(sptps_t *s, const char *data, uint16_t len) { - if(len) + (void)data; + + if(len) { return error(s, EIO, "Invalid ACK record length"); + } if(s->initiator) { - if(!chacha_poly1305_set_key(s->incipher, s->key)) + if(!chacha_poly1305_set_key(s->incipher, s->key)) { return error(s, EINVAL, "Failed to set counter"); + } } else { - if(!chacha_poly1305_set_key(s->incipher, s->key + CHACHA_POLY1305_KEYLEN)) + if(!chacha_poly1305_set_key(s->incipher, s->key + CHACHA_POLY1305_KEYLEN)) { return error(s, EINVAL, "Failed to set counter"); + } } free(s->key); @@ -248,17 +288,22 @@ static bool receive_ack(sptps_t *s, const char *data, uint16_t len) { // Receive a Key EXchange record, respond by sending a SIG record. static bool receive_kex(sptps_t *s, const char *data, uint16_t len) { // Verify length of the HELLO record - if(len != 1 + 32 + ECDH_SIZE) + if(len != 1 + 32 + ECDH_SIZE) { return error(s, EIO, "Invalid KEX record length"); + } // Ignore version number for now. // Make a copy of the KEX message, send_sig() and receive_sig() need it - if(s->hiskex) + if(s->hiskex) { return error(s, EINVAL, "Received a second KEX message before first has been processed"); + } + s->hiskex = realloc(s->hiskex, len); - if(!s->hiskex) + + if(!s->hiskex) { return error(s, errno, strerror(errno)); + } memcpy(s->hiskex, data, len); @@ -271,8 +316,9 @@ static bool receive_sig(sptps_t *s, const char *data, uint16_t len) { size_t siglen = ecdsa_size(s->hiskey); // Verify length of KEX record. - if(len != siglen) + if(len != siglen) { return error(s, EIO, "Invalid KEX record length"); + } // Concatenate both KEX messages, plus tag indicating if it is from the connection originator char msg[(1 + 32 + keylen) * 2 + 1 + s->labellen]; @@ -283,18 +329,23 @@ static bool receive_sig(sptps_t *s, const char *data, uint16_t len) { memcpy(msg + 1 + 2 * (33 + keylen), s->label, s->labellen); // Verify signature. - if(!ecdsa_verify(s->hiskey, msg, sizeof msg, data)) + if(!ecdsa_verify(s->hiskey, msg, sizeof(msg), data)) { return error(s, EIO, "Failed to verify SIG record"); + } // Compute shared secret. char shared[ECDH_SHARED_SIZE]; - if(!ecdh_compute_shared(s->ecdh, s->hiskex + 1 + 32, shared)) + + if(!ecdh_compute_shared(s->ecdh, s->hiskex + 1 + 32, shared)) { return error(s, EINVAL, "Failed to compute ECDH shared secret"); + } + s->ecdh = NULL; // Generate key material from shared secret. - if(!generate_key_material(s, shared, sizeof shared)) + if(!generate_key_material(s, shared, sizeof(shared))) { return false; + } free(s->mykex); free(s->hiskex); @@ -303,16 +354,19 @@ static bool receive_sig(sptps_t *s, const char *data, uint16_t len) { s->hiskex = NULL; // Send cipher change record - if(s->outstate && !send_ack(s)) + if(s->outstate && !send_ack(s)) { return false; + } // TODO: only set new keys after ACK has been set/received if(s->initiator) { - if(!chacha_poly1305_set_key(s->outcipher, s->key + CHACHA_POLY1305_KEYLEN)) + if(!chacha_poly1305_set_key(s->outcipher, s->key + CHACHA_POLY1305_KEYLEN)) { return error(s, EINVAL, "Failed to set key"); + } } else { - if(!chacha_poly1305_set_key(s->outcipher, s->key)) + if(!chacha_poly1305_set_key(s->outcipher, s->key)) { return error(s, EINVAL, "Failed to set key"); + } } return true; @@ -320,8 +374,9 @@ static bool receive_sig(sptps_t *s, const char *data, uint16_t len) { // Force another Key EXchange (for testing purposes). bool sptps_force_kex(sptps_t *s) { - if(!s->outstate || s->state != SPTPS_SECONDARY_KEX) + if(!s->outstate || s->state != SPTPS_SECONDARY_KEX) { return error(s, EINVAL, "Cannot force KEX in current state"); + } s->state = SPTPS_KEX; return send_kex(s); @@ -331,87 +386,127 @@ bool sptps_force_kex(sptps_t *s) { static bool receive_handshake(sptps_t *s, const char *data, uint16_t len) { // Only a few states to deal with handshaking. switch(s->state) { - case SPTPS_SECONDARY_KEX: - // We receive a secondary KEX request, first respond by sending our own. - if(!send_kex(s)) - return false; - case SPTPS_KEX: - // We have sent our KEX request, we expect our peer to sent one as well. - if(!receive_kex(s, data, len)) - return false; - s->state = SPTPS_SIG; - return true; - case SPTPS_SIG: - // If we already sent our secondary public ECDH key, we expect the peer to send his. - if(!receive_sig(s, data, len)) + case SPTPS_SECONDARY_KEX: + + // We receive a secondary KEX request, first respond by sending our own. + if(!send_kex(s)) { + return false; + } + + // fallthrough + case SPTPS_KEX: + + // We have sent our KEX request, we expect our peer to sent one as well. + if(!receive_kex(s, data, len)) { + return false; + } + + s->state = SPTPS_SIG; + return true; + + case SPTPS_SIG: + + // If we already sent our secondary public ECDH key, we expect the peer to send his. + if(!receive_sig(s, data, len)) { + return false; + } + + if(s->outstate) { + s->state = SPTPS_ACK; + } else { + s->outstate = true; + + if(!receive_ack(s, NULL, 0)) { return false; - if(s->outstate) - s->state = SPTPS_ACK; - else { - s->outstate = true; - if(!receive_ack(s, NULL, 0)) - return false; - s->receive_record(s->handle, SPTPS_HANDSHAKE, NULL, 0); - s->state = SPTPS_SECONDARY_KEX; } - return true; - case SPTPS_ACK: - // We expect a handshake message to indicate transition to the new keys. - if(!receive_ack(s, data, len)) - return false; s->receive_record(s->handle, SPTPS_HANDSHAKE, NULL, 0); s->state = SPTPS_SECONDARY_KEX; - return true; - // TODO: split ACK into a VERify and ACK? - default: - return error(s, EIO, "Invalid session state %d", s->state); + } + + return true; + + case SPTPS_ACK: + + // We expect a handshake message to indicate transition to the new keys. + if(!receive_ack(s, data, len)) { + return false; + } + + s->receive_record(s->handle, SPTPS_HANDSHAKE, NULL, 0); + s->state = SPTPS_SECONDARY_KEX; + return true; + + // TODO: split ACK into a VERify and ACK? + default: + return error(s, EIO, "Invalid session state %d", s->state); } } // Check datagram for valid HMAC bool sptps_verify_datagram(sptps_t *s, const void *data, size_t len) { - if(!s->instate || len < 21) - return error(s, EIO, "Received short packet"); + if(!s->instate) { + return error(s, EIO, "SPTPS state not ready to verify this datagram"); + } - // TODO: just decrypt without updating the replay window + if(len < 21) { + return error(s, EIO, "Received short packet in sptps_verify_datagram"); + } - return true; + uint32_t seqno; + memcpy(&seqno, data, 4); + seqno = ntohl(seqno); + // TODO: check whether seqno makes sense, to avoid CPU intensive decrypt + + return chacha_poly1305_verify(s->incipher, seqno, (const char *)data + 4, len - 4); } // Receive incoming data, datagram version. static bool sptps_receive_data_datagram(sptps_t *s, const void *vdata, size_t len) { const char *data = vdata; - if(len < (s->instate ? 21 : 5)) - return error(s, EIO, "Received short packet"); + if(len < (s->instate ? 21 : 5)) { + return error(s, EIO, "Received short packet in sptps_receive_data_datagram"); + } uint32_t seqno; memcpy(&seqno, data, 4); seqno = ntohl(seqno); if(!s->instate) { - if(seqno != s->inseqno) + if(seqno != s->inseqno) { return error(s, EIO, "Invalid packet seqno: %d != %d", seqno, s->inseqno); + } s->inseqno = seqno + 1; uint8_t type = data[4]; - if(type != SPTPS_HANDSHAKE) + if(type != SPTPS_HANDSHAKE) { return error(s, EIO, "Application record received before handshake finished"); + } return receive_handshake(s, data + 5, len - 5); } // Decrypt - char buffer[len]; + if(len > s->decrypted_buffer_len) { + s->decrypted_buffer_len *= 2; + char *new_buffer = realloc(s->decrypted_buffer, s->decrypted_buffer_len); + + if(!new_buffer) { + return error(s, errno, strerror(errno)); + } + + s->decrypted_buffer = new_buffer; + } size_t outlen; - if(!chacha_poly1305_decrypt(s->incipher, seqno, data + 4, len - 4, buffer, &outlen)) + if(!chacha_poly1305_decrypt(s->incipher, seqno, data + 4, len - 4, s->decrypted_buffer, &outlen)) { return error(s, EIO, "Failed to decrypt and verify packet"); + } // Replay protection using a sliding window of configurable size. // s->inseqno is expected sequence number @@ -425,14 +520,16 @@ static bool sptps_receive_data_datagram(sptps_t *s, const void *vdata, size_t le warning(s, "Lost %d packets\n", seqno - s->inseqno); // Mark all packets in the replay window as being late. memset(s->late, 255, s->replaywin); - } else if (seqno < s->inseqno) { + } else if(seqno < s->inseqno) { // If the sequence number is farther in the past than the bitmap goes, or if the packet was already received, drop it. - if((s->inseqno >= s->replaywin * 8 && seqno < s->inseqno - s->replaywin * 8) || !(s->late[(seqno / 8) % s->replaywin] & (1 << seqno % 8))) + if((s->inseqno >= s->replaywin * 8 && seqno < s->inseqno - s->replaywin * 8) || !(s->late[(seqno / 8) % s->replaywin] & (1 << seqno % 8))) { return error(s, EIO, "Received late or replayed packet, seqno %d, last received %d\n", seqno, s->inseqno); + } } else { // We missed some packets. Mark them in the bitmap as being late. - for(int i = s->inseqno; i < seqno; i++) + for(uint32_t i = s->inseqno; i < seqno; i++) { s->late[(i / 8) % s->replaywin] |= 1 << i % 8; + } } } @@ -440,27 +537,33 @@ static bool sptps_receive_data_datagram(sptps_t *s, const void *vdata, size_t le s->late[(seqno / 8) % s->replaywin] &= ~(1 << seqno % 8); } - if(seqno >= s->inseqno) + if(seqno >= s->inseqno) { s->inseqno = seqno + 1; + } - if(!s->inseqno) + if(!s->inseqno) { s->received = 0; - else + } else { s->received++; + } // Append a NULL byte for safety. - buffer[len - 20] = 0; + s->decrypted_buffer[len - 20] = 0; - uint8_t type = buffer[0]; + uint8_t type = s->decrypted_buffer[0]; if(type < SPTPS_HANDSHAKE) { - if(!s->instate) + if(!s->instate) { return error(s, EIO, "Application record received before handshake finished"); - if(!s->receive_record(s->handle, type, buffer + 1, len - 21)) + } + + if(!s->receive_record(s->handle, type, s->decrypted_buffer + 1, len - 21)) { abort(); + } } else if(type == SPTPS_HANDSHAKE) { - if(!receive_handshake(s, buffer + 1, len - 21)) + if(!receive_handshake(s, s->decrypted_buffer + 1, len - 21)) { abort(); + } } else { return error(s, EIO, "Invalid record type %d", type); } @@ -470,28 +573,35 @@ static bool sptps_receive_data_datagram(sptps_t *s, const void *vdata, size_t le // Receive incoming data. Check if it contains a complete record, if so, handle it. bool sptps_receive_data(sptps_t *s, const void *data, size_t len) { - if(!s->state) + if(!s->state) { return error(s, EIO, "Invalid session state zero"); + } - if(s->datagram) + if(s->datagram) { return sptps_receive_data_datagram(s, data, len); + } + + const char *ptr = data; while(len) { // First read the 2 length bytes. if(s->buflen < 2) { size_t toread = 2 - s->buflen; - if(toread > len) + + if(toread > len) { toread = len; + } - memcpy(s->inbuf + s->buflen, data, toread); + memcpy(s->inbuf + s->buflen, ptr, toread); s->buflen += toread; len -= toread; - data += toread; + ptr += toread; // Exit early if we don't have the full length. - if(s->buflen < 2) + if(s->buflen < 2) { return true; + } // Get the length bytes @@ -500,27 +610,33 @@ bool sptps_receive_data(sptps_t *s, const void *data, size_t len) { // If we have the length bytes, ensure our buffer can hold the whole request. s->inbuf = realloc(s->inbuf, s->reclen + 19UL); - if(!s->inbuf) + + if(!s->inbuf) { return error(s, errno, strerror(errno)); + } // Exit early if we have no more data to process. - if(!len) + if(!len) { return true; + } } // Read up to the end of the record. size_t toread = s->reclen + (s->instate ? 19UL : 3UL) - s->buflen; - if(toread > len) + + if(toread > len) { toread = len; + } - memcpy(s->inbuf + s->buflen, data, toread); + memcpy(s->inbuf + s->buflen, ptr, toread); s->buflen += toread; len -= toread; - data += toread; + ptr += toread; // If we don't have a whole record, exit. - if(s->buflen < s->reclen + (s->instate ? 19UL : 3UL)) + if(s->buflen < s->reclen + (s->instate ? 19UL : 3UL)) { return true; + } // Update sequence number. @@ -528,8 +644,9 @@ bool sptps_receive_data(sptps_t *s, const void *data, size_t len) { // Check HMAC and decrypt. if(s->instate) { - if(!chacha_poly1305_decrypt(s->incipher, seqno, s->inbuf + 2UL, s->reclen + 17UL, s->inbuf + 2UL, NULL)) + if(!chacha_poly1305_decrypt(s->incipher, seqno, s->inbuf + 2UL, s->reclen + 17UL, s->inbuf + 2UL, NULL)) { return error(s, EINVAL, "Failed to decrypt and verify record"); + } } // Append a NULL byte for safety. @@ -538,13 +655,17 @@ bool sptps_receive_data(sptps_t *s, const void *data, size_t len) { uint8_t type = s->inbuf[2]; if(type < SPTPS_HANDSHAKE) { - if(!s->instate) + if(!s->instate) { return error(s, EIO, "Application record received before handshake finished"); - if(!s->receive_record(s->handle, type, s->inbuf + 3, s->reclen)) + } + + if(!s->receive_record(s->handle, type, s->inbuf + 3, s->reclen)) { return false; + } } else if(type == SPTPS_HANDSHAKE) { - if(!receive_handshake(s, s->inbuf + 3, s->reclen)) + if(!receive_handshake(s, s->inbuf + 3, s->reclen)) { return false; + } } else { return error(s, EIO, "Invalid record type %d", type); } @@ -557,30 +678,49 @@ bool sptps_receive_data(sptps_t *s, const void *data, size_t len) { // Start a SPTPS session. bool sptps_start(sptps_t *s, void *handle, bool initiator, bool datagram, ecdsa_t *mykey, ecdsa_t *hiskey, const char *label, size_t labellen, send_data_t send_data, receive_record_t receive_record) { + if(!s || !mykey || !hiskey || !label || !labellen || !send_data || !receive_record) { + return error(s, EINVAL, "Invalid argument to sptps_start()"); + } + // Initialise struct sptps - memset(s, 0, sizeof *s); + memset(s, 0, sizeof(*s)); s->handle = handle; s->initiator = initiator; s->datagram = datagram; s->mykey = mykey; s->hiskey = hiskey; - s->replaywin = sptps_replaywin; + s->replaywin = 32; + s->decrypted_buffer_len = 1024; + s->decrypted_buffer = malloc(s->decrypted_buffer_len); + + if(!s->decrypted_buffer) { + return error(s, errno, strerror(errno)); + } + if(s->replaywin) { s->late = malloc(s->replaywin); - if(!s->late) + + if(!s->late) { return error(s, errno, strerror(errno)); + } + memset(s->late, 0, s->replaywin); } s->label = malloc(labellen); - if(!s->label) + + if(!s->label) { return error(s, errno, strerror(errno)); + } if(!datagram) { s->inbuf = malloc(7); - if(!s->inbuf) + + if(!s->inbuf) { return error(s, errno, strerror(errno)); + } + s->buflen = 0; } @@ -607,6 +747,8 @@ bool sptps_stop(sptps_t *s) { free(s->key); free(s->label); free(s->late); - memset(s, 0, sizeof *s); + memset(s->decrypted_buffer, 0, s->decrypted_buffer_len); + free(s->decrypted_buffer); + memset(s, 0, sizeof(*s)); return true; }