X-Git-Url: http://git.meshlink.io/?p=meshlink;a=blobdiff_plain;f=src%2Fprotocol_auth.c;h=a542ca9ea922813b75cc741f24dbe8d1f2550c9c;hp=b6018ca743e555107d326b39b875fa442ec285e1;hb=3fba80174dbe29bcfe0d121a2a1d2e61be5ee57b;hpb=65e8e06c6dc7349b11c3c1e8f4071b51e2994c65

diff --git a/src/protocol_auth.c b/src/protocol_auth.c
index b6018ca7..a542ca9e 100644
--- a/src/protocol_auth.c
+++ b/src/protocol_auth.c
@@ -20,38 +20,59 @@
 
 #include "system.h"
 
-#include <openssl/sha.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-
-#include "avl_tree.h"
+#include "splay_tree.h"
 #include "conf.h"
 #include "connection.h"
+#include "control.h"
+#include "control_common.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "crypto.h"
+#include "digest.h"
 #include "edge.h"
 #include "graph.h"
 #include "logger.h"
 #include "net.h"
 #include "netutl.h"
 #include "node.h"
+#include "prf.h"
 #include "protocol.h"
+#include "rsa.h"
 #include "utils.h"
 #include "xalloc.h"
 
 bool send_id(connection_t *c) {
-	return send_request(c, "%d %s %d", ID, myself->connection->name,
-						myself->connection->protocol_version);
+	gettimeofday(&c->start, NULL);
+
+	int minor = 0;
+
+	if(experimental) {
+		if(c->config_tree && !read_ecdsa_public_key(c))
+			minor = 1;
+		else
+			minor = myself->connection->protocol_minor;
+	}
+
+	return send_request(c, "%d %s %d.%d", ID, myself->connection->name, myself->connection->protocol_major, minor);
 }
 
-bool id_h(connection_t *c) {
+bool id_h(connection_t *c, char *request) {
 	char name[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
 
-	if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d " MAX_STRING " %d", name, &c->protocol_version) != 2) {
+	if(sscanf(request, "%*d " MAX_STRING " %d.%d", name, &c->protocol_major, &c->protocol_minor) < 2) {
 		logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "ID", c->name,
 			   c->hostname);
 		return false;
 	}
 
+	/* Check if this is a control connection */
+
+	if(name[0] == '^' && !strcmp(name + 1, controlcookie)) {
+		c->status.control = true;
+		c->allow_request = CONTROL;
+		c->last_ping_time = time(NULL) + 3600;
+		return send_request(c, "%d %d %d", ACK, TINC_CTL_VERSION_CURRENT, getpid());
+	}
+
 	/* Check if identity is a valid name */
 
 	if(!check_id(name)) {
@@ -76,9 +97,9 @@ bool id_h(connection_t *c) {
 
 	/* Check if version matches */
 
-	if(c->protocol_version != myself->connection->protocol_version) {
-		logger(LOG_ERR, "Peer %s (%s) uses incompatible version %d",
-			   c->name, c->hostname, c->protocol_version);
+	if(c->protocol_major != myself->connection->protocol_major) {
+		logger(LOG_ERR, "Peer %s (%s) uses incompatible version %d.%d",
+			   c->name, c->hostname, c->protocol_major, c->protocol_minor);
 		return false;
 	}
 
@@ -89,6 +110,9 @@ bool id_h(connection_t *c) {
 		return send_ack(c);
 	}
 
+	if(!experimental)
+		c->protocol_minor = 0;
+
 	if(!c->config_tree) {
 		init_configuration(&c->config_tree);
 
@@ -97,34 +121,61 @@ bool id_h(connection_t *c) {
 				   c->name);
 			return false;
 		}
-	}
 
-	if(!read_rsa_public_key(c)) {
-		return false;
+		if(experimental && c->protocol_minor >= 2)
+			if(!read_ecdsa_public_key(c))
+				return false;
+	} else {
+		if(c->protocol_minor && !ecdsa_active(&c->ecdsa))
+			c->protocol_minor = 1;
 	}
 
 	c->allow_request = METAKEY;
 
-	return send_metakey(c);
+	if(c->protocol_minor >= 2)
+		return send_metakey_ec(c);
+	else
+		return send_metakey(c);
 }
 
-bool send_metakey(connection_t *c) {
-	bool x;
+bool send_metakey_ec(connection_t *c) {
+	logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Sending ECDH metakey to %s", c->name);
+
+	size_t siglen = ecdsa_size(&myself->connection->ecdsa);
+
+	char key[(ECDH_SIZE + siglen) * 2 + 1];
 
-	int len = RSA_size(c->rsa_key);
+	// TODO: include nonce? Use relevant parts of SSH or TLS protocol
 
-	/* Allocate buffers for the meta key */
+	if(!ecdh_generate_public(&c->ecdh, key))
+		return false;
+
+	if(!ecdsa_sign(&myself->connection->ecdsa, key, ECDH_SIZE, key + ECDH_SIZE))
+		return false;
 
-	char buffer[2 * len + 1];
+	b64encode(key, key, ECDH_SIZE + siglen);
 	
-	c->outkey = xrealloc(c->outkey, len);
+	return send_request(c, "%d %s", METAKEY, key);
+}
 
-	if(!c->outctx)
-		c->outctx = xmalloc_and_zero(sizeof(*c->outctx));
+bool send_metakey(connection_t *c) {
+	if(!read_rsa_public_key(c))
+		return false;
 
-	/* Copy random data to the buffer */
+	if(!cipher_open_blowfish_ofb(&c->outcipher))
+		return false;
+	
+	if(!digest_open_sha1(&c->outdigest, -1))
+		return false;
+
+	size_t len = rsa_size(&c->rsa);
+	char key[len];
+	char enckey[len];
+	char hexkey[2 * len + 1];
 
-	RAND_pseudo_bytes((unsigned char *)c->outkey, len);
+	/* Create a random key */
+
+	randomize(key, len);
 
 	/* The message we send must be smaller than the modulus of the RSA key.
 	   By definition, for a key of k bits, the following formula holds:
@@ -136,13 +187,13 @@ bool send_metakey(connection_t *c) {
 	   This can be done by setting the most significant bit to zero.
 	 */
 
-	c->outkey[0] &= 0x7F;
+	key[0] &= 0x7F;
+
+	cipher_set_key_from_rsa(&c->outcipher, key, len, true);
 
 	ifdebug(SCARY_THINGS) {
-		bin2hex(c->outkey, buffer, len);
-		buffer[len * 2] = '\0';
-		logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Generated random meta key (unencrypted): %s",
-			   buffer);
+		bin2hex(key, hexkey, len);
+		logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Generated random meta key (unencrypted): %s", hexkey);
 	}
 
 	/* Encrypt the random data
@@ -152,132 +203,151 @@ bool send_metakey(connection_t *c) {
 	   with a length equal to that of the modulus of the RSA key.
 	 */
 
-	if(RSA_public_encrypt(len, (unsigned char *)c->outkey, (unsigned char *)buffer, c->rsa_key, RSA_NO_PADDING) != len) {
-		logger(LOG_ERR, "Error during encryption of meta key for %s (%s)",
-			   c->name, c->hostname);
+	if(!rsa_public_encrypt(&c->rsa, key, len, enckey)) {
+		logger(LOG_ERR, "Error during encryption of meta key for %s (%s)", c->name, c->hostname);
 		return false;
 	}
 
 	/* Convert the encrypted random data to a hexadecimal formatted string */
 
-	bin2hex(buffer, buffer, len);
-	buffer[len * 2] = '\0';
+	bin2hex(enckey, hexkey, len);
 
 	/* Send the meta key */
 
-	x = send_request(c, "%d %d %d %d %d %s", METAKEY,
-					 c->outcipher ? c->outcipher->nid : 0,
-					 c->outdigest ? c->outdigest->type : 0, c->outmaclength,
-					 c->outcompression, buffer);
+	bool result = send_request(c, "%d %d %d %d %d %s", METAKEY,
+			 cipher_get_nid(&c->outcipher),
+			 digest_get_nid(&c->outdigest), c->outmaclength,
+			 c->outcompression, hexkey);
+	
+	c->status.encryptout = true;
+	return result;
+}
 
-	/* Further outgoing requests are encrypted with the key we just generated */
+static bool metakey_ec_h(connection_t *c, const char *request) {
+	size_t siglen = ecdsa_size(&c->ecdsa);
+	char key[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
 
-	if(c->outcipher) {
-		if(!EVP_EncryptInit(c->outctx, c->outcipher,
-					(unsigned char *)c->outkey + len - c->outcipher->key_len,
-					(unsigned char *)c->outkey + len - c->outcipher->key_len -
-					c->outcipher->iv_len)) {
-			logger(LOG_ERR, "Error during initialisation of cipher for %s (%s): %s",
-					c->name, c->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
-			return false;
-		}
+	logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Got ECDH metakey from %s", c->name);
 
-		c->status.encryptout = true;
+	if(sscanf(request, "%*d " MAX_STRING, key) != 1) {
+		logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "METAKEY", c->name, c->hostname);
+		return false;
 	}
 
-	return x;
-}
+	int inlen = b64decode(key, key, sizeof key);
 
-bool metakey_h(connection_t *c) {
-	char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
-	int cipher, digest, maclength, compression;
-	int len;
+	if(inlen != (ECDH_SIZE + siglen)) {
+		logger(LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name, c->hostname, "wrong keylength");
+		return false;
+	}
 
-	if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d %d %d %d %d " MAX_STRING, &cipher, &digest, &maclength, &compression, buffer) != 5) {
-		logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "METAKEY", c->name,
-			   c->hostname);
+	if(!ecdsa_verify(&c->ecdsa, key, ECDH_SIZE, key + ECDH_SIZE)) {
+		logger(LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name, c->hostname, "invalid ECDSA signature");
 		return false;
 	}
 
-	len = RSA_size(myself->connection->rsa_key);
+	char shared[ECDH_SHARED_SIZE];
 
-	/* Check if the length of the meta key is all right */
+	if(!ecdh_compute_shared(&c->ecdh, key, shared))
+		return false;
 
-	if(strlen(buffer) != len * 2) {
-		logger(LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name, c->hostname, "wrong keylength");
+	/* Update our crypto end */
+
+	if(!cipher_open_by_name(&c->incipher, "aes-256-ofb"))
+		return false;
+	if(!digest_open_by_name(&c->indigest, "sha512", -1))
 		return false;
+	if(!cipher_open_by_name(&c->outcipher, "aes-256-ofb"))
+		return false;
+	if(!digest_open_by_name(&c->outdigest, "sha512", -1))
+		return false;
+
+	size_t mykeylen = cipher_keylength(&c->incipher);
+	size_t hiskeylen = cipher_keylength(&c->outcipher);
+
+	char *mykey;
+	char *hiskey;
+	char *seed;
+	
+	if(strcmp(myself->name, c->name) < 0) {
+		mykey = key;
+		hiskey = key + mykeylen * 2;
+		xasprintf(&seed, "tinc TCP key expansion %s %s", myself->name, c->name);
+	} else {
+		mykey = key + hiskeylen * 2;
+		hiskey = key;
+		xasprintf(&seed, "tinc TCP key expansion %s %s", c->name, myself->name);
 	}
 
-	/* Allocate buffers for the meta key */
+	if(!prf(shared, ECDH_SHARED_SIZE, seed, strlen(seed), key, hiskeylen * 2 + mykeylen * 2))
+		return false;
 
-	c->inkey = xrealloc(c->inkey, len);
+	free(seed);
 
-	if(!c->inctx)
-		c->inctx = xmalloc_and_zero(sizeof(*c->inctx));
+	cipher_set_key(&c->incipher, mykey, false);
+	digest_set_key(&c->indigest, mykey + mykeylen, mykeylen);
 
-	/* Convert the challenge from hexadecimal back to binary */
+	cipher_set_key(&c->outcipher, hiskey, true);
+	digest_set_key(&c->outdigest, hiskey + hiskeylen, hiskeylen);
 
-	hex2bin(buffer, buffer, len);
+	c->status.decryptin = true;
+	c->status.encryptout = true;
+	c->allow_request = CHALLENGE;
 
-	/* Decrypt the meta key */
+	return send_challenge(c);
+}
 
-	if(RSA_private_decrypt(len, (unsigned char *)buffer, (unsigned char *)c->inkey, myself->connection->rsa_key, RSA_NO_PADDING) != len) {	/* See challenge() */
-		logger(LOG_ERR, "Error during decryption of meta key for %s (%s)",
-			   c->name, c->hostname);
+bool metakey_h(connection_t *c, char *request) {
+	if(c->protocol_minor >= 2)
+		return metakey_ec_h(c, request);
+
+	char hexkey[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
+	int cipher, digest, maclength, compression;
+	size_t len = rsa_size(&myself->connection->rsa);
+	char enckey[len];
+	char key[len];
+
+	if(sscanf(request, "%*d %d %d %d %d " MAX_STRING, &cipher, &digest, &maclength, &compression, hexkey) != 5) {
+		logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "METAKEY", c->name, c->hostname);
 		return false;
 	}
 
-	ifdebug(SCARY_THINGS) {
-		bin2hex(c->inkey, buffer, len);
-		buffer[len * 2] = '\0';
-		logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Received random meta key (unencrypted): %s", buffer);
-	}
+	/* Convert the challenge from hexadecimal back to binary */
 
-	/* All incoming requests will now be encrypted. */
+	int inlen = hex2bin(hexkey, enckey, sizeof enckey);
 
-	/* Check and lookup cipher and digest algorithms */
+	/* Check if the length of the meta key is all right */
 
-	if(cipher) {
-		c->incipher = EVP_get_cipherbynid(cipher);
-		
-		if(!c->incipher) {
-			logger(LOG_ERR, "%s (%s) uses unknown cipher!", c->name, c->hostname);
-			return false;
-		}
+	if(inlen != len) {
+		logger(LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name, c->hostname, "wrong keylength");
+		return false;
+	}
 
-		if(!EVP_DecryptInit(c->inctx, c->incipher,
-					(unsigned char *)c->inkey + len - c->incipher->key_len,
-					(unsigned char *)c->inkey + len - c->incipher->key_len -
-					c->incipher->iv_len)) {
-			logger(LOG_ERR, "Error during initialisation of cipher from %s (%s): %s",
-					c->name, c->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
-			return false;
-		}
+	/* Decrypt the meta key */
 
-		c->status.decryptin = true;
-	} else {
-		c->incipher = NULL;
+	if(!rsa_private_decrypt(&myself->connection->rsa, enckey, len, key)) {
+		logger(LOG_ERR, "Error during decryption of meta key for %s (%s)", c->name, c->hostname);
+		return false;
 	}
 
-	c->inmaclength = maclength;
+	ifdebug(SCARY_THINGS) {
+		bin2hex(key, hexkey, len);
+		logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Received random meta key (unencrypted): %s", hexkey);
+	}
 
-	if(digest) {
-		c->indigest = EVP_get_digestbynid(digest);
+	/* Check and lookup cipher and digest algorithms */
 
-		if(!c->indigest) {
-			logger(LOG_ERR, "Node %s (%s) uses unknown digest!", c->name, c->hostname);
-			return false;
-		}
+	if(!cipher_open_by_nid(&c->incipher, cipher) || !cipher_set_key_from_rsa(&c->incipher, key, len, false)) {
+		logger(LOG_ERR, "Error during initialisation of cipher from %s (%s)", c->name, c->hostname);
+		return false;
+	}
 
-		if(c->inmaclength > c->indigest->md_size || c->inmaclength < 0) {
-			logger(LOG_ERR, "%s (%s) uses bogus MAC length!", c->name, c->hostname);
-			return false;
-		}
-	} else {
-		c->indigest = NULL;
+	if(!digest_open_by_nid(&c->indigest, digest, -1)) {
+		logger(LOG_ERR, "Error during initialisation of digest from %s (%s)", c->name, c->hostname);
+		return false;
 	}
 
-	c->incompression = compression;
+	c->status.decryptin = true;
 
 	c->allow_request = CHALLENGE;
 
@@ -285,134 +355,87 @@ bool metakey_h(connection_t *c) {
 }
 
 bool send_challenge(connection_t *c) {
-	/* CHECKME: what is most reasonable value for len? */
-
-	int len = RSA_size(c->rsa_key);
+	size_t len = c->protocol_minor >= 2 ? ECDH_SIZE : rsa_size(&c->rsa);
+	char buffer[len * 2 + 1];
 
-	/* Allocate buffers for the challenge */
-
-	char buffer[2 * len + 1];
-
-	c->hischallenge = xrealloc(c->hischallenge, len);
+	if(!c->hischallenge)
+		c->hischallenge = xrealloc(c->hischallenge, len);
 
 	/* Copy random data to the buffer */
 
-	RAND_pseudo_bytes((unsigned char *)c->hischallenge, len);
+	randomize(c->hischallenge, len);
 
 	/* Convert to hex */
 
 	bin2hex(c->hischallenge, buffer, len);
-	buffer[len * 2] = '\0';
 
 	/* Send the challenge */
 
 	return send_request(c, "%d %s", CHALLENGE, buffer);
 }
 
-bool challenge_h(connection_t *c) {
+bool challenge_h(connection_t *c, char *request) {
 	char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
-	int len;
+	size_t len = c->protocol_minor >= 2 ? ECDH_SIZE : rsa_size(&myself->connection->rsa);
+	size_t digestlen = digest_length(&c->indigest);
+	char digest[digestlen];
 
-	if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d " MAX_STRING, buffer) != 1) {
-		logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "CHALLENGE", c->name,
-			   c->hostname);
+	if(sscanf(request, "%*d " MAX_STRING, buffer) != 1) {
+		logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "CHALLENGE", c->name, c->hostname);
 		return false;
 	}
 
-	len = RSA_size(myself->connection->rsa_key);
+	/* Convert the challenge from hexadecimal back to binary */
+
+	int inlen = hex2bin(buffer, buffer, sizeof buffer);
 
 	/* Check if the length of the challenge is all right */
 
-	if(strlen(buffer) != len * 2) {
-		logger(LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name,
-			   c->hostname, "wrong challenge length");
+	if(inlen != len) {
+		logger(LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name, c->hostname, "wrong challenge length");
 		return false;
 	}
 
-	/* Allocate buffers for the challenge */
-
-	c->mychallenge = xrealloc(c->mychallenge, len);
-
-	/* Convert the challenge from hexadecimal back to binary */
-
-	hex2bin(buffer, c->mychallenge, len);
-
 	c->allow_request = CHAL_REPLY;
 
-	/* Rest is done by send_chal_reply() */
-
-	return send_chal_reply(c);
-}
-
-bool send_chal_reply(connection_t *c) {
-	char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2 + 1];
-	EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
-
 	/* Calculate the hash from the challenge we received */
 
-	if(!EVP_DigestInit(&ctx, c->indigest)
-			|| !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, c->mychallenge, RSA_size(myself->connection->rsa_key))
-			|| !EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, (unsigned char *)hash, NULL)) {
-		logger(LOG_ERR, "Error during calculation of response for %s (%s): %s",
-			c->name, c->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
-		return false;
-	}
+	digest_create(&c->indigest, buffer, len, digest);
 
 	/* Convert the hash to a hexadecimal formatted string */
 
-	bin2hex(hash, hash, c->indigest->md_size);
-	hash[c->indigest->md_size * 2] = '\0';
+	bin2hex(digest, buffer, digestlen);
 
 	/* Send the reply */
 
-	return send_request(c, "%d %s", CHAL_REPLY, hash);
+	return send_request(c, "%d %s", CHAL_REPLY, buffer);
 }
 
-bool chal_reply_h(connection_t *c) {
+bool chal_reply_h(connection_t *c, char *request) {
 	char hishash[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
-	char myhash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-	EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
 
-	if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d " MAX_STRING, hishash) != 1) {
+	if(sscanf(request, "%*d " MAX_STRING, hishash) != 1) {
 		logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "CHAL_REPLY", c->name,
 			   c->hostname);
 		return false;
 	}
 
-	/* Check if the length of the hash is all right */
-
-	if(strlen(hishash) != c->outdigest->md_size * 2) {
-		logger(LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name,
-			   c->hostname, "wrong challenge reply length");
-		return false;
-	}
-
 	/* Convert the hash to binary format */
 
-	hex2bin(hishash, hishash, c->outdigest->md_size);
+	int inlen = hex2bin(hishash, hishash, sizeof hishash);
 
-	/* Calculate the hash from the challenge we sent */
+	/* Check if the length of the hash is all right */
 
-	if(!EVP_DigestInit(&ctx, c->outdigest)
-			|| !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, c->hischallenge, RSA_size(c->rsa_key))
-			|| !EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, (unsigned char *)myhash, NULL)) {
-		logger(LOG_ERR, "Error during calculation of response from %s (%s): %s",
-			c->name, c->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
+	if(inlen != digest_length(&c->outdigest)) {
+		logger(LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name, c->hostname, "wrong challenge reply length");
 		return false;
 	}
 
-	/* Verify the incoming hash with the calculated hash */
-
-	if(memcmp(hishash, myhash, c->outdigest->md_size)) {
-		logger(LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name,
-			   c->hostname, "wrong challenge reply");
 
-		ifdebug(SCARY_THINGS) {
-			bin2hex(myhash, hishash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
-			hishash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2] = '\0';
-			logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Expected challenge reply: %s", hishash);
-		}
+	/* Verify the hash */
 
+	if(!digest_verify(&c->outdigest, c->hischallenge, c->protocol_minor >= 2 ? ECDH_SIZE : rsa_size(&c->rsa), hishash)) {
+		logger(LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name, c->hostname, "wrong challenge reply");
 		return false;
 	}
 
@@ -420,12 +443,31 @@ bool chal_reply_h(connection_t *c) {
 	   Send an acknowledgement with the rest of the information needed.
 	 */
 
+	free(c->hischallenge);
+	c->hischallenge = NULL;
 	c->allow_request = ACK;
 
 	return send_ack(c);
 }
 
+static bool send_upgrade(connection_t *c) {
+	/* Special case when protocol_minor is 1: the other end is ECDSA capable,
+	 * but doesn't know our key yet. So send it now. */
+
+	char *pubkey = ecdsa_get_base64_public_key(&myself->connection->ecdsa);
+
+	if(!pubkey)
+		return false;
+
+	bool result = send_request(c, "%d %s", ACK, pubkey);
+	free(pubkey);
+	return result;
+}
+
 bool send_ack(connection_t *c) {
+	if(c->protocol_minor == 1)
+		return send_upgrade(c);
+
 	/* ACK message contains rest of the information the other end needs
 	   to create node_t and edge_t structures. */
 
@@ -459,7 +501,7 @@ bool send_ack(connection_t *c) {
 }
 
 static void send_everything(connection_t *c) {
-	avl_node_t *node, *node2;
+	splay_node_t *node, *node2;
 	node_t *n;
 	subnet_t *s;
 	edge_t *e;
@@ -490,7 +532,29 @@ static void send_everything(connection_t *c) {
 	}
 }
 
-bool ack_h(connection_t *c) {
+static bool upgrade_h(connection_t *c, char *request) {
+	char pubkey[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
+
+	if(sscanf(request, "%*d " MAX_STRING, pubkey) != 1) {
+		logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "ACK", c->name, c->hostname);
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	if(ecdsa_active(&c->ecdsa) || read_ecdsa_public_key(c)) {
+		logger(LOG_INFO, "Already have ECDSA public key from %s (%s), not upgrading.", c->name, c->hostname);
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	logger(LOG_INFO, "Got ECDSA public key from %s (%s), upgrading!", c->name, c->hostname);
+	append_config_file(c->name, "ECDSAPublicKey", pubkey);
+	c->allow_request = TERMREQ;
+	return send_termreq(c);
+}
+
+bool ack_h(connection_t *c, char *request) {
+	if(c->protocol_minor == 1)
+		return upgrade_h(c, request);
+
 	char hisport[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
 	char *hisaddress;
 	int weight, mtu;
@@ -498,7 +562,7 @@ bool ack_h(connection_t *c) {
 	node_t *n;
 	bool choice;
 
-	if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d " MAX_STRING " %d %x", hisport, &weight, &options) != 3) {
+	if(sscanf(request, "%*d " MAX_STRING " %d %x", hisport, &weight, &options) != 3) {
 		logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "ACK", c->name,
 			   c->hostname);
 		return false;
@@ -515,8 +579,17 @@ bool ack_h(connection_t *c) {
 	} else {
 		if(n->connection) {
 			/* Oh dear, we already have a connection to this node. */
-			ifdebug(CONNECTIONS) logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Established a second connection with %s (%s), closing old connection",
-					   n->name, n->hostname);
+			ifdebug(CONNECTIONS) logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Established a second connection with %s (%s), closing old connection", n->connection->name, n->connection->hostname);
+
+			if(n->connection->outgoing) {
+				if(c->outgoing)
+					logger(LOG_WARNING, "Two outgoing connections to the same node!");
+				else
+					c->outgoing = n->connection->outgoing;
+
+				n->connection->outgoing = NULL;
+			}
+
 			terminate_connection(n->connection, false);
 			/* Run graph algorithm to purge key and make sure up/down scripts are rerun with new IP addresses and stuff */
 			graph();
@@ -544,6 +617,9 @@ bool ack_h(connection_t *c) {
 			c->options &= ~OPTION_CLAMP_MSS;
 	}
 
+	if(c->protocol_minor > 0)
+		c->node->status.ecdh = true;
+
 	/* Activate this connection */
 
 	c->allow_request = ALL;