X-Git-Url: http://git.meshlink.io/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=src%2Fprotocol_auth.c;h=670bfbc23ee0cc48e908d481e150186dfa634db6;hb=2956559f7d12caa9779207525419801e0e9ab3e3;hp=21f13a13ad042b9a7e5df7de10612db692341f9b;hpb=084ba04f51441098c55d3bd21b11bbe368e7b52e;p=meshlink diff --git a/src/protocol_auth.c b/src/protocol_auth.c index 21f13a13..670bfbc2 100644 --- a/src/protocol_auth.c +++ b/src/protocol_auth.c @@ -1,7 +1,6 @@ /* protocol_auth.c -- handle the meta-protocol, authentication - Copyright (C) 1999-2005 Ivo Timmermans, - 2000-2014 Guus Sliepen + Copyright (C) 2014 Guus Sliepen This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by @@ -30,13 +29,11 @@ #include "graph.h" #include "logger.h" #include "meta.h" -#include "names.h" #include "net.h" #include "netutl.h" #include "node.h" #include "prf.h" #include "protocol.h" -#include "rsa.h" #include "sptps.h" #include "utils.h" #include "xalloc.h" @@ -132,14 +129,7 @@ static bool send_proxyrequest(connection_t *c) { bool send_id(connection_t *c) { gettimeofday(&c->start, NULL); - int minor = 0; - - if(experimental) { - if(c->outgoing && !read_ecdsa_public_key(c)) - minor = 1; - else - minor = myself->connection->protocol_minor; - } + int minor = myself->connection->protocol_minor; if(proxytype && c->outgoing) if(!send_proxyrequest(c)) @@ -337,9 +327,6 @@ bool id_h(connection_t *c, const char *request) { return send_ack(c); } - if(!experimental) - c->protocol_minor = 0; - if(!c->config_tree) { init_configuration(&c->config_tree); @@ -348,8 +335,7 @@ bool id_h(connection_t *c, const char *request) { return false; } - if(experimental) - read_ecdsa_public_key(c); + read_ecdsa_public_key(c); } else { if(c->protocol_minor && !ecdsa_active(c->ecdsa)) c->protocol_minor = 1; @@ -365,256 +351,18 @@ bool id_h(connection_t *c, const char *request) { c->allow_request = METAKEY; - if(c->protocol_minor >= 2) { - c->allow_request = ACK; - char label[25 + strlen(myself->name) + strlen(c->name)]; - - if(c->outgoing) - snprintf(label, sizeof label, "tinc TCP key expansion %s %s", myself->name, c->name); - else - snprintf(label, sizeof label, "tinc TCP key expansion %s %s", c->name, myself->name); - - return sptps_start(&c->sptps, c, c->outgoing, false, myself->connection->ecdsa, c->ecdsa, label, sizeof label, send_meta_sptps, receive_meta_sptps); - } else { - return send_metakey(c); - } -} - -bool send_metakey(connection_t *c) { - if(!read_rsa_public_key(c)) - return false; - - if(!(c->outcipher = cipher_open_blowfish_ofb())) - return false; - - if(!(c->outdigest = digest_open_sha1(-1))) - return false; - - size_t len = rsa_size(c->rsa); - char key[len]; - char enckey[len]; - char hexkey[2 * len + 1]; - - /* Create a random key */ - - randomize(key, len); - - /* The message we send must be smaller than the modulus of the RSA key. - By definition, for a key of k bits, the following formula holds: - - 2^(k-1) <= modulus < 2^(k) - - Where ^ means "to the power of", not "xor". - This means that to be sure, we must choose our message < 2^(k-1). - This can be done by setting the most significant bit to zero. - */ - - key[0] &= 0x7F; - - if(!cipher_set_key_from_rsa(c->outcipher, key, len, true)) - return false; - - if(debug_level >= DEBUG_SCARY_THINGS) { - bin2hex(key, hexkey, len); - logger(DEBUG_SCARY_THINGS, LOG_DEBUG, "Generated random meta key (unencrypted): %s", hexkey); - } - - /* Encrypt the random data - - We do not use one of the PKCS padding schemes here. - This is allowed, because we encrypt a totally random string - with a length equal to that of the modulus of the RSA key. - */ - - if(!rsa_public_encrypt(c->rsa, key, len, enckey)) { - logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Error during encryption of meta key for %s (%s)", c->name, c->hostname); - return false; - } - - /* Convert the encrypted random data to a hexadecimal formatted string */ - - bin2hex(enckey, hexkey, len); - - /* Send the meta key */ - - bool result = send_request(c, "%d %d %d %d %d %s", METAKEY, - cipher_get_nid(c->outcipher), - digest_get_nid(c->outdigest), c->outmaclength, - c->outcompression, hexkey); - - c->status.encryptout = true; - return result; -} - -bool metakey_h(connection_t *c, const char *request) { - char hexkey[MAX_STRING_SIZE]; - int cipher, digest, maclength, compression; - size_t len = rsa_size(myself->connection->rsa); - char enckey[len]; - char key[len]; - - if(sscanf(request, "%*d %d %d %d %d " MAX_STRING, &cipher, &digest, &maclength, &compression, hexkey) != 5) { - logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "METAKEY", c->name, c->hostname); - return false; - } - - /* Convert the challenge from hexadecimal back to binary */ - - int inlen = hex2bin(hexkey, enckey, sizeof enckey); - - /* Check if the length of the meta key is all right */ - - if(inlen != len) { - logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name, c->hostname, "wrong keylength"); - return false; - } - - /* Decrypt the meta key */ - - if(!rsa_private_decrypt(myself->connection->rsa, enckey, len, key)) { - logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Error during decryption of meta key for %s (%s)", c->name, c->hostname); - return false; - } - - if(debug_level >= DEBUG_SCARY_THINGS) { - bin2hex(key, hexkey, len); - logger(DEBUG_SCARY_THINGS, LOG_DEBUG, "Received random meta key (unencrypted): %s", hexkey); - } - - /* Check and lookup cipher and digest algorithms */ - - if(!(c->incipher = cipher_open_by_nid(cipher)) || !cipher_set_key_from_rsa(c->incipher, key, len, false)) { - logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Error during initialisation of cipher from %s (%s)", c->name, c->hostname); - return false; - } - - if(!(c->indigest = digest_open_by_nid(digest, -1))) { - logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Error during initialisation of digest from %s (%s)", c->name, c->hostname); - return false; - } - - c->status.decryptin = true; - - c->allow_request = CHALLENGE; - - return send_challenge(c); -} - -bool send_challenge(connection_t *c) { - size_t len = rsa_size(c->rsa); - char buffer[len * 2 + 1]; - - if(!c->hischallenge) - c->hischallenge = xrealloc(c->hischallenge, len); - - /* Copy random data to the buffer */ - - randomize(c->hischallenge, len); - - /* Convert to hex */ - - bin2hex(c->hischallenge, buffer, len); - - /* Send the challenge */ - - return send_request(c, "%d %s", CHALLENGE, buffer); -} - -bool challenge_h(connection_t *c, const char *request) { - char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE]; - size_t len = rsa_size(myself->connection->rsa); - size_t digestlen = digest_length(c->indigest); - char digest[digestlen]; - - if(sscanf(request, "%*d " MAX_STRING, buffer) != 1) { - logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "CHALLENGE", c->name, c->hostname); - return false; - } - - /* Convert the challenge from hexadecimal back to binary */ - - int inlen = hex2bin(buffer, buffer, sizeof buffer); - - /* Check if the length of the challenge is all right */ - - if(inlen != len) { - logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name, c->hostname, "wrong challenge length"); - return false; - } - - /* Calculate the hash from the challenge we received */ - - if(!digest_create(c->indigest, buffer, len, digest)) - return false; - - /* Convert the hash to a hexadecimal formatted string */ - - bin2hex(digest, buffer, digestlen); - - /* Send the reply */ - - c->allow_request = CHAL_REPLY; - - return send_request(c, "%d %s", CHAL_REPLY, buffer); -} - -bool chal_reply_h(connection_t *c, const char *request) { - char hishash[MAX_STRING_SIZE]; - - if(sscanf(request, "%*d " MAX_STRING, hishash) != 1) { - logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "CHAL_REPLY", c->name, - c->hostname); - return false; - } - - /* Convert the hash to binary format */ - - int inlen = hex2bin(hishash, hishash, sizeof hishash); - - /* Check if the length of the hash is all right */ - - if(inlen != digest_length(c->outdigest)) { - logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name, c->hostname, "wrong challenge reply length"); - return false; - } - - - /* Verify the hash */ - - if(!digest_verify(c->outdigest, c->hischallenge, rsa_size(c->rsa), hishash)) { - logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name, c->hostname, "wrong challenge reply"); - return false; - } - - /* Identity has now been positively verified. - Send an acknowledgement with the rest of the information needed. - */ - - free(c->hischallenge); - c->hischallenge = NULL; c->allow_request = ACK; + char label[25 + strlen(myself->name) + strlen(c->name)]; - return send_ack(c); -} - -static bool send_upgrade(connection_t *c) { - /* Special case when protocol_minor is 1: the other end is ECDSA capable, - * but doesn't know our key yet. So send it now. */ - - char *pubkey = ecdsa_get_base64_public_key(myself->connection->ecdsa); - - if(!pubkey) - return false; + if(c->outgoing) + snprintf(label, sizeof label, "tinc TCP key expansion %s %s", myself->name, c->name); + else + snprintf(label, sizeof label, "tinc TCP key expansion %s %s", c->name, myself->name); - bool result = send_request(c, "%d %s", ACK, pubkey); - free(pubkey); - return result; + return sptps_start(&c->sptps, c, c->outgoing, false, myself->connection->ecdsa, c->ecdsa, label, sizeof label, send_meta_sptps, receive_meta_sptps); } bool send_ack(connection_t *c) { - if(c->protocol_minor == 1) - return send_upgrade(c); - /* ACK message contains rest of the information the other end needs to create node_t and edge_t structures. */ @@ -645,7 +393,7 @@ bool send_ack(connection_t *c) { if(!get_config_int(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "Weight"), &c->estimated_weight)) get_config_int(lookup_config(config_tree, "Weight"), &c->estimated_weight); - return send_request(c, "%d %s %d %x", ACK, myport, c->estimated_weight, (c->options & 0xffffff) | (experimental ? (PROT_MINOR << 24) : 0)); + return send_request(c, "%d %s %d %x", ACK, myport, c->estimated_weight, (c->options & 0xffffff) | (PROT_MINOR << 24)); } static void send_everything(connection_t *c) { @@ -669,29 +417,7 @@ static void send_everything(connection_t *c) { } } -static bool upgrade_h(connection_t *c, const char *request) { - char pubkey[MAX_STRING_SIZE]; - - if(sscanf(request, "%*d " MAX_STRING, pubkey) != 1) { - logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "ACK", c->name, c->hostname); - return false; - } - - if(ecdsa_active(c->ecdsa) || read_ecdsa_public_key(c)) { - logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_INFO, "Already have ECDSA public key from %s (%s), not upgrading.", c->name, c->hostname); - return false; - } - - logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_INFO, "Got ECDSA public key from %s (%s), upgrading!", c->name, c->hostname); - append_config_file(c->name, "ECDSAPublicKey", pubkey); - c->allow_request = TERMREQ; - return send_termreq(c); -} - bool ack_h(connection_t *c, const char *request) { - if(c->protocol_minor == 1) - return upgrade_h(c, request); - char hisport[MAX_STRING_SIZE]; char *hisaddress; int weight, mtu; @@ -782,10 +508,7 @@ bool ack_h(connection_t *c, const char *request) { /* Notify everyone of the new edge */ - if(tunnelserver) - send_add_edge(c, c->edge); - else - send_add_edge(everyone, c->edge); + send_add_edge(everyone, c->edge); /* Run MST and SSSP algorithms */