/*
protocol_auth.c -- handle the meta-protocol, authentication
- Copyright (C) 1999-2002 Ivo Timmermans <ivo@o2w.nl>,
- 2000-2002 Guus Sliepen <guus@sliepen.eu.org>
+ Copyright (C) 2014-2017 Guus Sliepen <guus@meshlink.io>
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
- You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
- along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
- Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
-
- $Id: protocol_auth.c,v 1.1.4.16 2002/09/09 21:24:45 guus Exp $
+ You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along
+ with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc.,
+ 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
*/
-#include "config.h"
-
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <syslog.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-
-#include <utils.h>
-#include <xalloc.h>
-#include <avl_tree.h>
-
-#include <openssl/sha.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-
-#ifndef HAVE_RAND_PSEUDO_BYTES
-#define RAND_pseudo_bytes RAND_bytes
-#endif
+#include "system.h"
#include "conf.h"
-#include "net.h"
-#include "netutl.h"
-#include "protocol.h"
-#include "meta.h"
#include "connection.h"
-#include "node.h"
+#include "ecdsa.h"
#include "edge.h"
#include "graph.h"
-
-#include "system.h"
-
-int send_id(connection_t * c)
-{
- cp();
-
- return send_request(c, "%d %s %d", ID, myself->connection->name,
- myself->connection->protocol_version);
-}
-
-int id_h(connection_t * c)
-{
- char name[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
- int bla;
-
- cp();
-
- if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d " MAX_STRING " %d", name, &c->protocol_version) != 2) {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s)"), "ID", c->name,
- c->hostname);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* Check if identity is a valid name */
-
- if(check_id(name)) {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s): %s"), "ID", c->name,
- c->hostname, "invalid name");
- return -1;
+#include "logger.h"
+#include "meshlink_internal.h"
+#include "meta.h"
+#include "net.h"
+#include "netutl.h"
+#include "node.h"
+#include "packmsg.h"
+#include "prf.h"
+#include "protocol.h"
+#include "sptps.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+#include "xalloc.h"
+#include "ed25519/sha512.h"
+
+#include <assert.h>
+
+extern bool node_write_devclass(meshlink_handle_t *mesh, node_t *n);
+
+static bool send_proxyrequest(meshlink_handle_t *mesh, connection_t *c) {
+ switch(mesh->proxytype) {
+ case PROXY_HTTP: {
+ char *host;
+ char *port;
+
+ sockaddr2str(&c->address, &host, &port);
+ send_request(mesh, c, NULL, "CONNECT %s:%s HTTP/1.1\r\n\r", host, port);
+ free(host);
+ free(port);
+ return true;
}
- /* If we set c->name in advance, make sure we are connected to the right host */
-
- if(c->name) {
- if(strcmp(c->name, name)) {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Peer %s is %s instead of %s"), c->hostname, name,
- c->name);
- return -1;
+ case PROXY_SOCKS4: {
+ if(c->address.sa.sa_family != AF_INET) {
+ logger(mesh, MESHLINK_ERROR, "Cannot connect to an IPv6 host through a SOCKS 4 proxy!");
+ return false;
}
- } else
- c->name = xstrdup(name);
-
- /* Check if version matches */
-
- if(c->protocol_version != myself->connection->protocol_version) {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Peer %s (%s) uses incompatible version %d"),
- c->name, c->hostname, c->protocol_version);
- return -1;
- }
- if(bypass_security) {
- if(!c->config_tree)
- init_configuration(&c->config_tree);
- c->allow_request = ACK;
- return send_ack(c);
- }
-
- if(!c->config_tree) {
- init_configuration(&c->config_tree);
-
- bla = read_connection_config(c);
+ char s4req[9 + (mesh->proxyuser ? strlen(mesh->proxyuser) : 0)];
+ s4req[0] = 4;
+ s4req[1] = 1;
+ memcpy(s4req + 2, &c->address.in.sin_port, 2);
+ memcpy(s4req + 4, &c->address.in.sin_addr, 4);
- if(bla) {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Peer %s had unknown identity (%s)"), c->hostname,
- c->name);
- return -1;
+ if(mesh->proxyuser) {
+ memcpy(s4req + 8, mesh->proxyuser, strlen(mesh->proxyuser));
}
- }
- if(read_rsa_public_key(c)) {
- return -1;
+ s4req[sizeof(s4req) - 1] = 0;
+ c->tcplen = 8;
+ return send_meta(mesh, c, s4req, sizeof(s4req));
}
- /* Check some options */
-
- if((get_config_bool(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "IndirectData"), &bla) && bla) || myself->options & OPTION_INDIRECT)
- c->options |= OPTION_INDIRECT;
-
- if((get_config_bool(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "TCPOnly"), &bla) && bla) || myself->options & OPTION_TCPONLY)
- c->options |= OPTION_TCPONLY | OPTION_INDIRECT;
-
- c->allow_request = METAKEY;
-
- return send_metakey(c);
-}
-
-int send_metakey(connection_t * c)
-{
- char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
- int len, x;
-
- cp();
-
- len = RSA_size(c->rsa_key);
-
- /* Allocate buffers for the meta key */
-
- if(!c->outkey)
- c->outkey = xmalloc(len);
+ case PROXY_SOCKS5: {
+ int len = 3 + 6 + (c->address.sa.sa_family == AF_INET ? 4 : 16);
+ c->tcplen = 2;
- if(!c->outctx)
- c->outctx = xmalloc(sizeof(*c->outctx));
- cp();
- /* Copy random data to the buffer */
-
- RAND_bytes(c->outkey, len);
-
- /* The message we send must be smaller than the modulus of the RSA key.
- By definition, for a key of k bits, the following formula holds:
+ if(mesh->proxypass) {
+ len += 3 + strlen(mesh->proxyuser) + strlen(mesh->proxypass);
+ }
- 2^(k-1) <= modulus < 2^(k)
+ char s5req[len];
+ int i = 0;
+ s5req[i++] = 5;
+ s5req[i++] = 1;
+
+ if(mesh->proxypass) {
+ s5req[i++] = 2;
+ s5req[i++] = 1;
+ s5req[i++] = strlen(mesh->proxyuser);
+ memcpy(s5req + i, mesh->proxyuser, strlen(mesh->proxyuser));
+ i += strlen(mesh->proxyuser);
+ s5req[i++] = strlen(mesh->proxypass);
+ memcpy(s5req + i, mesh->proxypass, strlen(mesh->proxypass));
+ i += strlen(mesh->proxypass);
+ c->tcplen += 2;
+ } else {
+ s5req[i++] = 0;
+ }
- Where ^ means "to the power of", not "xor".
- This means that to be sure, we must choose our message < 2^(k-1).
- This can be done by setting the most significant bit to zero.
- */
+ s5req[i++] = 5;
+ s5req[i++] = 1;
+ s5req[i++] = 0;
+
+ if(c->address.sa.sa_family == AF_INET) {
+ s5req[i++] = 1;
+ memcpy(s5req + i, &c->address.in.sin_addr, 4);
+ i += 4;
+ memcpy(s5req + i, &c->address.in.sin_port, 2);
+ i += 2;
+ c->tcplen += 10;
+ } else if(c->address.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6) {
+ s5req[i++] = 3;
+ memcpy(s5req + i, &c->address.in6.sin6_addr, 16);
+ i += 16;
+ memcpy(s5req + i, &c->address.in6.sin6_port, 2);
+ i += 2;
+ c->tcplen += 22;
+ } else {
+ logger(mesh, MESHLINK_ERROR, "Address family %hx not supported for SOCKS 5 proxies!", c->address.sa.sa_family);
+ return false;
+ }
- c->outkey[0] &= 0x7F;
+ if(i > len) {
+ abort();
+ }
- if(debug_lvl >= DEBUG_SCARY_THINGS) {
- bin2hex(c->outkey, buffer, len);
- buffer[len * 2] = '\0';
- syslog(LOG_DEBUG, _("Generated random meta key (unencrypted): %s"),
- buffer);
+ return send_meta(mesh, c, s5req, sizeof(s5req));
}
- /* Encrypt the random data
-
- We do not use one of the PKCS padding schemes here.
- This is allowed, because we encrypt a totally random string
- with a length equal to that of the modulus of the RSA key.
- */
+ case PROXY_SOCKS4A:
+ logger(mesh, MESHLINK_ERROR, "Proxy type not implemented yet");
+ return false;
- if(RSA_public_encrypt(len, c->outkey, buffer, c->rsa_key, RSA_NO_PADDING) != len) {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Error during encryption of meta key for %s (%s)"),
- c->name, c->hostname);
- return -1;
+ default:
+ logger(mesh, MESHLINK_ERROR, "Unknown proxy type");
+ return false;
}
+}
- /* Convert the encrypted random data to a hexadecimal formatted string */
+bool send_id(meshlink_handle_t *mesh, connection_t *c) {
+ if(mesh->proxytype && c->outgoing)
+ if(!send_proxyrequest(mesh, c)) {
+ return false;
+ }
- bin2hex(buffer, buffer, len);
- buffer[len * 2] = '\0';
+ return send_request(mesh, c, NULL, "%d %s %d.%d %s", ID, mesh->self->name, PROT_MAJOR, PROT_MINOR, mesh->appname);
+}
- /* Send the meta key */
+static bool finalize_invitation(meshlink_handle_t *mesh, connection_t *c, const void *data, uint16_t len) {
+ if(len != 32) {
+ logger(mesh, MESHLINK_ERROR, "Received invalid key from invited node %s!\n", c->name);
+ return false;
+ }
- x = send_request(c, "%d %d %d %d %d %s", METAKEY,
- c->outcipher ? c->outcipher->nid : 0,
- c->outdigest ? c->outdigest->type : 0, c->outmaclength,
- c->outcompression, buffer);
+ // Create a new node
+ node_t *n = new_node();
+ n->name = xstrdup(c->name);
+ n->devclass = DEV_CLASS_UNKNOWN;
+ n->ecdsa = ecdsa_set_public_key(data);
+ n->submesh = c->submesh;
+ node_add(mesh, n);
+ node_write_config(mesh, n);
- /* Further outgoing requests are encrypted with the key we just generated */
+ logger(mesh, MESHLINK_INFO, "Key successfully received from %s", c->name);
- if(c->outcipher) {
- EVP_EncryptInit(c->outctx, c->outcipher,
- c->outkey + len - c->outcipher->key_len,
- c->outkey + len - c->outcipher->key_len -
- c->outcipher->iv_len);
+ //TODO: callback to application to inform of an accepted invitation
- c->status.encryptout = 1;
- }
+ sptps_send_record(&c->sptps, 1, "", 0);
- return x;
+ return true;
}
-int metakey_h(connection_t * c)
-{
- char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
- int cipher, digest, maclength, compression;
- int len;
-
- cp();
+static bool receive_invitation_sptps(void *handle, uint8_t type, const void *data, uint16_t len) {
+ connection_t *c = handle;
+ meshlink_handle_t *mesh = c->mesh;
- if(sscanf
- (c->buffer, "%*d %d %d %d %d " MAX_STRING, &cipher, &digest, &maclength,
- &compression, buffer) != 5) {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s)"), "METAKEY", c->name,
- c->hostname);
- return -1;
+ if(type == 128) {
+ return true;
}
- len = RSA_size(myself->connection->rsa_key);
-
- /* Check if the length of the meta key is all right */
-
- if(strlen(buffer) != len * 2) {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Possible intruder %s (%s): %s"), c->name,
- c->hostname, "wrong keylength");
- return -1;
+ if(type == 1 && c->status.invitation_used) {
+ return finalize_invitation(mesh, c, data, len);
}
- /* Allocate buffers for the meta key */
-
- if(!c->inkey)
- c->inkey = xmalloc(len);
-
- if(!c->inctx)
- c->inctx = xmalloc(sizeof(*c->inctx));
-
- /* Convert the challenge from hexadecimal back to binary */
-
- hex2bin(buffer, buffer, len);
-
- /* Decrypt the meta key */
-
- if(RSA_private_decrypt(len, buffer, c->inkey, myself->connection->rsa_key, RSA_NO_PADDING) != len) { /* See challenge() */
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Error during encryption of meta key for %s (%s)"),
- c->name, c->hostname);
- return -1;
+ if(type != 0 || len != 18 || c->status.invitation_used) {
+ return false;
}
- if(debug_lvl >= DEBUG_SCARY_THINGS) {
- bin2hex(c->inkey, buffer, len);
- buffer[len * 2] = '\0';
- syslog(LOG_DEBUG, _("Received random meta key (unencrypted): %s"),
- buffer);
+ // Recover the filename from the cookie and the key
+ char *fingerprint = ecdsa_get_base64_public_key(mesh->invitation_key);
+ char hash[64];
+ char hashbuf[18 + strlen(fingerprint)];
+ char cookie[25];
+ memcpy(hashbuf, data, 18);
+ memcpy(hashbuf + 18, fingerprint, sizeof(hashbuf) - 18);
+ sha512(hashbuf, sizeof(hashbuf), hash);
+ b64encode_urlsafe(hash, cookie, 18);
+ free(fingerprint);
+
+ config_t config;
+
+ if(!invitation_read(mesh, "current", cookie, &config, mesh->config_key)) {
+ logger(mesh, MESHLINK_ERROR, "Error while trying to read invitation file\n");
+ return false;
}
- /* All incoming requests will now be encrypted. */
-
- /* Check and lookup cipher and digest algorithms */
+ // Read the new node's Name from the file
+ packmsg_input_t in = {config.buf, config.len};
+ packmsg_get_uint32(&in); // skip version
+ free(c->name);
+ c->name = packmsg_get_str_dup(&in);
- if(cipher) {
- c->incipher = EVP_get_cipherbynid(cipher);
+ // Check if the file contains Sub-Mesh information
+ char *submesh_name = packmsg_get_str_dup(&in);
- if(!c->incipher) {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("%s (%s) uses unknown cipher!"), c->name,
- c->hostname);
- return -1;
- }
-
- EVP_DecryptInit(c->inctx, c->incipher,
- c->inkey + len - c->incipher->key_len,
- c->inkey + len - c->incipher->key_len -
- c->incipher->iv_len);
-
- c->status.decryptin = 1;
+ if(!strcmp(submesh_name, CORE_MESH)) {
+ c->submesh = NULL;
} else {
- c->incipher = NULL;
- }
-
- c->inmaclength = maclength;
-
- if(digest) {
- c->indigest = EVP_get_digestbynid(digest);
-
- if(!c->indigest) {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Node %s (%s) uses unknown digest!"), c->name,
- c->hostname);
- return -1;
+ if(!check_id(submesh_name)) {
+ logger(mesh, MESHLINK_ERROR, "Invalid invitation file %s\n", cookie);
+ abort();
+ return false;
}
- if(c->inmaclength > c->indigest->md_size || c->inmaclength < 0) {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("%s (%s) uses bogus MAC length!"), c->name,
- c->hostname);
- return -1;
+ c->submesh = lookup_or_create_submesh(mesh, submesh_name);
+
+ if(!c->submesh) {
+ return false;
}
- } else {
- c->indigest = NULL;
}
- c->incompression = compression;
-
- c->allow_request = CHALLENGE;
-
- return send_challenge(c);
-}
-
-int send_challenge(connection_t * c)
-{
- char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
- int len, x;
-
- cp();
-
- /* CHECKME: what is most reasonable value for len? */
-
- len = RSA_size(c->rsa_key);
-
- /* Allocate buffers for the challenge */
-
- if(!c->hischallenge)
- c->hischallenge = xmalloc(len);
+ // Send the node the contents of the invitation file
+ sptps_send_record(&c->sptps, 0, config.buf, config.len);
- /* Copy random data to the buffer */
+ config_free(&config);
+ free(submesh_name);
- RAND_bytes(c->hischallenge, len);
+ c->status.invitation_used = true;
- /* Convert to hex */
-
- bin2hex(c->hischallenge, buffer, len);
- buffer[len * 2] = '\0';
-
- /* Send the challenge */
-
- x = send_request(c, "%d %s", CHALLENGE, buffer);
-
- return x;
+ logger(mesh, MESHLINK_INFO, "Invitation %s successfully sent to %s", cookie, c->name);
+ return true;
}
-int challenge_h(connection_t * c)
-{
- char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
- int len;
-
- cp();
-
- if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d " MAX_STRING, buffer) != 1) {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s)"), "CHALLENGE", c->name,
- c->hostname);
- return -1;
- }
-
- len = RSA_size(myself->connection->rsa_key);
-
- /* Check if the length of the challenge is all right */
+bool id_h(meshlink_handle_t *mesh, connection_t *c, const char *request) {
+ char name[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
- if(strlen(buffer) != len * 2) {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Possible intruder %s (%s): %s"), c->name,
- c->hostname, "wrong challenge length");
- return -1;
+ if(sscanf(request, "%*d " MAX_STRING " %d.%d", name, &c->protocol_major, &c->protocol_minor) < 2) {
+ logger(mesh, MESHLINK_ERROR, "Got bad %s from %s", "ID", c->name);
+ return false;
}
- /* Allocate buffers for the challenge */
-
- if(!c->mychallenge)
- c->mychallenge = xmalloc(len);
-
- /* Convert the challenge from hexadecimal back to binary */
+ /* Check if this is an invitation */
- hex2bin(buffer, c->mychallenge, len);
-
- c->allow_request = CHAL_REPLY;
+ if(name[0] == '?') {
+ if(!mesh->invitation_key) {
+ logger(mesh, MESHLINK_ERROR, "Got invitation from %s but we don't have an invitation key", c->name);
+ return false;
+ }
- /* Rest is done by send_chal_reply() */
+ c->ecdsa = ecdsa_set_base64_public_key(name + 1);
- return send_chal_reply(c);
-}
+ if(!c->ecdsa) {
+ logger(mesh, MESHLINK_ERROR, "Got bad invitation from %s", c->name);
+ return false;
+ }
-int send_chal_reply(connection_t * c)
-{
- char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2 + 1];
- EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+ c->status.invitation = true;
+ char *mykey = ecdsa_get_base64_public_key(mesh->invitation_key);
- cp();
+ if(!mykey) {
+ return false;
+ }
- /* Calculate the hash from the challenge we received */
+ if(!send_request(mesh, c, NULL, "%d %s", ACK, mykey)) {
+ return false;
+ }
- EVP_DigestInit(&ctx, c->indigest);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, c->mychallenge,
- RSA_size(myself->connection->rsa_key));
- EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, hash, NULL);
+ free(mykey);
- /* Convert the hash to a hexadecimal formatted string */
+ c->protocol_minor = 2;
+ c->allow_request = 1;
- bin2hex(hash, hash, c->indigest->md_size);
- hash[c->indigest->md_size * 2] = '\0';
+ return sptps_start(&c->sptps, c, false, false, mesh->invitation_key, c->ecdsa, meshlink_invitation_label, sizeof(meshlink_invitation_label), send_meta_sptps, receive_invitation_sptps);
+ }
- /* Send the reply */
+ /* Check if identity is a valid name */
- return send_request(c, "%d %s", CHAL_REPLY, hash);
-}
+ if(!check_id(name)) {
+ logger(mesh, MESHLINK_ERROR, "Got bad %s from %s: %s", "ID", c->name, "invalid name");
+ return false;
+ }
-int chal_reply_h(connection_t * c)
-{
- char hishash[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
- char myhash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+ /* If this is an outgoing connection, make sure we are connected to the right host */
- cp();
+ if(c->outgoing) {
+ if(strcmp(c->name, name)) {
+ logger(mesh, MESHLINK_ERROR, "Peer is %s instead of %s", name, c->name);
+ return false;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if(c->name) {
+ free(c->name);
+ }
- if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d " MAX_STRING, hishash) != 1) {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s)"), "CHAL_REPLY", c->name,
- c->hostname);
- return -1;
+ c->name = xstrdup(name);
}
- /* Check if the length of the hash is all right */
+ /* Check if version matches */
- if(strlen(hishash) != c->outdigest->md_size * 2) {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Possible intruder %s (%s): %s"), c->name,
- c->hostname, _("wrong challenge reply length"));
- return -1;
+ if(c->protocol_major != PROT_MAJOR) {
+ logger(mesh, MESHLINK_ERROR, "Peer %s uses incompatible version %d.%d",
+ c->name, c->protocol_major, c->protocol_minor);
+ return false;
}
- /* Convert the hash to binary format */
+ /* Check if we know this node */
- hex2bin(hishash, hishash, c->outdigest->md_size);
+ node_t *n = lookup_node(mesh, c->name);
- /* Calculate the hash from the challenge we sent */
+ if(!n) {
+ logger(mesh, MESHLINK_ERROR, "Peer %s has unknown identity", c->name);
+ return false;
+ }
- EVP_DigestInit(&ctx, c->outdigest);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, c->hischallenge, RSA_size(c->rsa_key));
- EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, myhash, NULL);
+ if(n->status.blacklisted) {
+ logger(mesh, MESHLINK_EPEER, "Peer %s is blacklisted", c->name);
+ return false;
+ }
- /* Verify the incoming hash with the calculated hash */
+ node_read_public_key(mesh, n);
- if(memcmp(hishash, myhash, c->outdigest->md_size)) {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Possible intruder %s (%s): %s"), c->name,
- c->hostname, _("wrong challenge reply"));
+ if(!ecdsa_active(n->ecdsa)) {
+ logger(mesh, MESHLINK_ERROR, "No key known for peer %s", c->name);
- if(debug_lvl >= DEBUG_SCARY_THINGS) {
- bin2hex(myhash, hishash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- hishash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2] = '\0';
- syslog(LOG_DEBUG, _("Expected challenge reply: %s"), hishash);
+ if(n->status.reachable && !n->status.waitingforkey) {
+ logger(mesh, MESHLINK_INFO, "Requesting key from peer %s", c->name);
+ send_req_key(mesh, n);
}
- return -1;
+ return false;
}
- /* Identity has now been positively verified.
- Send an acknowledgement with the rest of the information needed.
- */
-
- c->allow_request = ACK;
-
- return send_ack(c);
-}
-
-int send_ack(connection_t * c)
-{
- /* ACK message contains rest of the information the other end needs
- to create node_t and edge_t structures. */
+ /* Forbid version rollback for nodes whose ECDSA key we know */
- int x;
- struct timeval now;
-
- cp();
+ if(ecdsa_active(c->ecdsa) && c->protocol_minor < 2) {
+ logger(mesh, MESHLINK_ERROR, "Peer %s tries to roll back protocol version to %d.%d",
+ c->name, c->protocol_major, c->protocol_minor);
+ return false;
+ }
- /* Estimate weight */
+ c->allow_request = ACK;
+ char label[sizeof(meshlink_tcp_label) + strlen(mesh->self->name) + strlen(c->name) + 2];
- gettimeofday(&now, NULL);
- c->estimated_weight =
- (now.tv_sec - c->start.tv_sec) * 1000 + (now.tv_usec -
- c->start.tv_usec) / 1000;
- x = send_request(c, "%d %s %d %lx", ACK, myport, c->estimated_weight,
- c->options);
+ if(c->outgoing) {
+ snprintf(label, sizeof(label), "%s %s %s", meshlink_tcp_label, mesh->self->name, c->name);
+ } else {
+ snprintf(label, sizeof(label), "%s %s %s", meshlink_tcp_label, c->name, mesh->self->name);
+ }
- return x;
+ char buf1[1024], buf2[1024];
+ bin2hex((uint8_t *)mesh->private_key + 64, buf1, 32);
+ bin2hex((uint8_t *)n->ecdsa + 64, buf2, 32);
+ logger(mesh, MESHLINK_DEBUG, "Connection to %s mykey %s hiskey %s", c->name, buf1, buf2);
+ return sptps_start(&c->sptps, c, c->outgoing, false, mesh->private_key, n->ecdsa, label, sizeof(label) - 1, send_meta_sptps, receive_meta_sptps);
}
-void send_everything(connection_t * c)
-{
- avl_node_t *node, *node2;
- node_t *n;
- subnet_t *s;
- edge_t *e;
+bool send_ack(meshlink_handle_t *mesh, connection_t *c) {
+ return send_request(mesh, c, NULL, "%d %s %d %x", ACK, mesh->myport, mesh->devclass, OPTION_PMTU_DISCOVERY | (PROT_MINOR << 24));
+}
+static void send_everything(meshlink_handle_t *mesh, connection_t *c) {
/* Send all known subnets and edges */
- for(node = node_tree->head; node; node = node->next) {
- n = (node_t *) node->data;
-
- for(node2 = n->subnet_tree->head; node2; node2 = node2->next) {
- s = (subnet_t *) node2->data;
- send_add_subnet(c, s);
- }
-
- for(node2 = n->edge_tree->head; node2; node2 = node2->next) {
- e = (edge_t *) node2->data;
- send_add_edge(c, e);
+ for splay_each(node_t, n, mesh->nodes) {
+ for splay_each(edge_t, e, n->edge_tree) {
+ send_add_edge(mesh, c, e, 0);
}
}
}
-int ack_h(connection_t * c)
-{
+bool ack_h(meshlink_handle_t *mesh, connection_t *c, const char *request) {
char hisport[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
- char *hisaddress, *dummy;
- int weight;
- long int options;
+ int devclass;
+ uint32_t options;
node_t *n;
- cp();
+ if(sscanf(request, "%*d " MAX_STRING " %d %x", hisport, &devclass, &options) != 3) {
+ logger(mesh, MESHLINK_ERROR, "Got bad %s from %s", "ACK", c->name);
+ return false;
+ }
- if(sscanf
- (c->buffer, "%*d " MAX_STRING " %d %lx", hisport, &weight, &options) != 3) {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s)"), "ACK", c->name,
- c->hostname);
- return -1;
+ if(devclass < 0 || devclass >= DEV_CLASS_COUNT) {
+ logger(mesh, MESHLINK_ERROR, "Got bad %s from %s: %s", "ACK", c->name, "devclass invalid");
+ return false;
}
/* Check if we already have a node_t for him */
- n = lookup_node(c->name);
+ n = lookup_node(mesh, c->name);
if(!n) {
n = new_node();
n->name = xstrdup(c->name);
- node_add(n);
+ node_add(mesh, n);
} else {
if(n->connection) {
/* Oh dear, we already have a connection to this node. */
- if(debug_lvl >= DEBUG_CONNECTIONS)
- syslog(LOG_DEBUG, _("Established a second connection with %s (%s), closing old connection"),
- n->name, n->hostname);
- terminate_connection(n->connection, 0);
+ logger(mesh, MESHLINK_DEBUG, "Established a second connection with %s, closing old connection", n->connection->name);
+
+ if(n->connection->outgoing) {
+ if(c->outgoing) {
+ logger(mesh, MESHLINK_WARNING, "Two outgoing connections to the same node!");
+ } else {
+ c->outgoing = n->connection->outgoing;
+ }
+
+ n->connection->outgoing = NULL;
+ }
+
+ terminate_connection(mesh, n->connection, false);
+ /* Run graph algorithm to keep things in sync */
+ graph(mesh);
}
}
+ n->devclass = devclass;
+ n->status.dirty = true;
+
+ n->last_successfull_connection = mesh->loop.now.tv_sec;
+
n->connection = c;
c->node = n;
- c->options |= options;
/* Activate this connection */
c->allow_request = ALL;
- c->status.active = 1;
+ c->status.active = true;
- if(debug_lvl >= DEBUG_CONNECTIONS)
- syslog(LOG_NOTICE, _("Connection with %s (%s) activated"), c->name,
- c->hostname);
+ logger(mesh, MESHLINK_INFO, "Connection with %s activated", c->name);
/* Send him everything we know */
- send_everything(c);
+ send_everything(mesh, c);
/* Create an edge_t for this connection */
+ assert(devclass >= 0 && devclass < DEV_CLASS_COUNT);
+
c->edge = new_edge();
- cp();
- c->edge->from = myself;
+ c->edge->from = mesh->self;
c->edge->to = n;
- sockaddr2str(&c->address, &hisaddress, &dummy);
- c->edge->address = str2sockaddr(hisaddress, hisport);
- free(hisaddress);
- free(dummy);
- c->edge->weight = (weight + c->estimated_weight) / 2;
+ sockaddrcpy_setport(&c->edge->address, &c->address, atoi(hisport));
+ c->edge->weight = dev_class_traits[devclass].edge_weight;
c->edge->connection = c;
- c->edge->options = c->options;
- edge_add(c->edge);
+ edge_add(mesh, c->edge);
/* Notify everyone of the new edge */
- send_add_edge(broadcast, c->edge);
+ send_add_edge(mesh, mesh->everyone, c->edge, 0);
/* Run MST and SSSP algorithms */
- graph();
+ graph(mesh);
- return 0;
+ return true;
}